Elections and Ti Spanish Left
Socialist Press1979 1979-03-21Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 6 →
Read from the scan by machine and not corrected: expect misread words, and now and then a caption or a line from a neighbouring story. For anything you quote, read the scan.
Scan page 6
VA LOKUMiSTA The greatest surprise of the Spanish general election on March 1 was the performance of the two candidacies in Euskadi (the Basque provinces)
supported by the two branches of ETA, the Basque nationalist organisation.
The more moderate ETA (political military) has for some time declared a truce in the war with the central government and no longer carries out terrorist actions.
Its political wing ElA was the main ingredient in one of the two radical nationalist candidacies in Euskadi-Euskadiko Eskerra (the left of Euskadi).
Cross 'Left' in this case was never interpreted in class terms but as a radical national (i.e. cross-class) opposition to the proposals by the centrai government land the main workers' parties) for a virtually meaningless formal: "autonomy" for the Basque country.
In this respect Euskadiko Eskerra differs little, except in tone, from the right wing Basque Nationalist Party (PNV).
And in fact in Navarra (the fourth "disputed" Basque province) PNV and Euskadiko Eskerra presented a joint list.
But the difference remained in the mind of the electorate. Euskadiko Eskerra • was identified with ETA.
That was much more true of the other and much more successful left" nationalist candidacy-Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity).
Endorsed
These candidates were publicly endorsed by ETA (military) which has been responsible for the outstindingly effective campaign of terrorism against the Francoist armed The objective of this candi. dacy was two-fold: to underzista contin mine the traditional PNV within the forces of Basque nationalism; and to give the lie to the massive public campaign conducted by the political forces of Francoism, the bourgeoisie, the reformists and Stalinists and the PNV, designed to isolate ETA terrorism as the work of a tiny handful of armed militants devoid of popular support.
The (illegal) political parties behind Herri Batasuna included the Popular Socialist Revolutionary Party (HAS!), the Party of Revolutionary Patriotic Workers (LAIA) and the Basque Socialist Party (ESB), along with some "independents"
These included the elderly Successful Herri Batasuna candidate Paco Letamendia bourgeois poet Telesforo de Monzon famous for his role in the (bourgeois) Basque government destroyed by Franco in the Civil War.
Monzon, along with 100 other Basques is currently a political prisoner of the regime, and was throughout the campaign on hunger strike.
This, combined with the fact that he was top of the list of candidates in one province, served to give Herri Batasuna an immense amount of pre-electoral publicity (except of course on the state-run broadcasting services where their existence was not acknowledged).
Monzon's presence on the lists was proof of the essentially cross-class nature of this campaign.
As the campaign went on its List the Mc 1 Pact cries of "Socialism and Independence" became more and more the single demand of "Independence"
In the results, Herri Batasuna got over 10% of the votes in the four Basque provinces and over 15% in the two where nationalism is most militant (Biscay and Guipuscoa).
Herri Batasuna won three seats in parliament (to Euskadiko Eskerra's one and the PNV's 8). They say they will not go to Madrid.
These strongly nationalist political forces are not themselves capable of advancing the interests of the working class and the youth of Euskadi.
In fact their cross class politics represents a danger to those interests in the long run.
They have nonetheless grown as a result of representing the most militant struggle for the legitimate right to national sclf-determination of the Basques.
Chauvinism
They have attracted significant sections of the Basque working class and the radicalised youth because of the grossly reactionary "big Spain" chauvinism of the main workers' parties.
These parties have joined with the Francoists and the bourgeoisie to stifle national rights to self-determination in Spain.
Only in Euskadi and Andalucia, still the most politically explosive regions in Spain, did disillusion with the main 1 workers' parties express itself in support for another 'left' political alternative.
In Andalucia the Andalucian Socialist Party (PSA)-much to the humiliation of the PSOEwon five parliamentary seats.
But on a nation-wide level" there was no turn towards those candidates who claimed to present a revolutionary or left alternative to the PSOE and the CP.
The two Maoist parties-the Labour Party (PTE) and the Revolutionary Workers Organis*Un Gobierno firme panaıvencer elparo ERES ARREZA Gobierno firme ararvencer eL2359 ation (ORT)-ran candidates in most provinces-but came out with less than one percent of the vote and no seats.
Both these parties cling onto a bit of support in areas where they helped to mobilise the workers during the darkest periods of the Franco dictatorship.
But today they are losing this support since they. have both moved decisively to the right, supporting the bourgeois constitution, the parliamentary road and the anti-terrorist laws ot the state.
Destined to disappear There is no longer any political space between them and the reformists and CP Stalinists, and they are surely destined to disappear.
To their left stood the Liat -Uni Gobierno firme paraivencer elparo.
ERISMARCA UnGobierno firme pararvencer elparo.
TUIYOTOT ESTRA FUERZA centrist Communist Movement (MC) now unified with the Communist Left Movement (OIC) which stood candidates with the LCR (Spanish section of the USFI) in the last . This time again the LCR tried to set up a joint list with the MC/OIC-very much on the lines of the British IMG's "Socialist Unity" bid to have joint candidates with the SWP.
In the end the two stood separately, both of them receiving only a tiny handful of votes.
We would not, of course, judge an election campaign. which claimed to be Trotskyist on the number of votes it got.
Rather we look to see whether it fought for:a clear and principled revolutionary alternative to the, reactjonary leadership of reformists, Stalinists and PSOE poster nationalists.
On that criterion the LC campaign must be judged failure.
In face of the confusion inevitable with up to 10 lists a claiming to represent th interests of the working class.
the task of a Trotskyist part was political clarification.
This required merciles exposure of the leadership which had led to disunity il the working class, and th search for a tactic which woult express that need for unity an‹ independence of the workin!
Class.
Confusion The LCR, however, aug mented the confusion: They pointed out correctly that the last thing in the world that the main workers' parties wantec was a clear parliamentary majority.
But then the LCR made the reformists' and Stalinists ambition easier for them, by calling, not for a united working class vote behind the workers' parties to force them into a majority, but simply for a vote for the LCR.
If it/ had any effect at all; this call would under the Spanish proportional representation system of voting have made such a majority of workers' parties more difficult to achieve.
This failure to produce a clear strategy in the elections; was not just an isolated mistake.
It reflects growing adaptation of the LCR to the collaborationist misleaders the working class reflected in the strong electoralism of the LCR's campaign (Vote LCR-the workers' left to parliament-the revolutionary youth to parliament'*) and its. concomitant adaptation to reformist policies.
Change constitution Thus the LCR called for "changing" the reactionary constitution inaugurated a few months ago.
They called for "purging" the armed forces and police lunchanged ence te tars of Franco ==e-15: Jacenaro 22 =3 i50 = 11 = 205509
Scan page 7
Wednesday Page ORA ACAN
----- pull-quotes -----
-FURRER ga Communista contingent marching
trabia jo "OMUNİST