Who is leading the civil war in Nicaragua ?

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Grist, ne can continue to rignt a separate struggles OT antiThere is always the possibili- throughout the world can ty that the Guard will remove achieve a major onslaught on him themselves to secure their the system itself.

For the first ten years or so after the overthrow of Spanish imperialism, Central America was a federal state.

The following fifty years saw d series of wars between conservative and liberal parties in the different states in which internal conflict was largely structured by alliances with like parties of other countries.

The requirements of the local bourgeoisies compelled balkanization, but in reality Central America is very much a coherent unity.

It is because of this that the civil war in Nicaragua is having such an enormous impact on the rest of the region.

The outcome of events there will have rapid and deep-seated effect in the neighbouring states, not to mention Latin America as a whole.

Vanguard

Nicaragua is in the vanguard of the struggle.

On the face of things the reason why it is Nicaragua that will be the first to fall lies in the extraordinary nature of the Somoza regime.

Anastasio Somoza, the present incumbent, is the heir to family fiet that was established in the 30s by his father with the aid of the U.S. marines.

Although there have from time to time been various puppet presidents, usually cousins or nepnews, the Somozas have retained personal power over the country for the last 45 years.

With this power they have amassed a huge fortune and maintain control over the infrastructure of the economy.

Should Anastasio succumb to his present 'heart condition' there is always his brother or his son, the runt of the litter Anastasio III, waiting in the wings.

But they are highly unlikely to reap the rewards of the family heirloom-the state-first and foremost •because "somozismo" has now become an impediment to the defence of capitalist relations as a whole.

Monopoly • The monopoly of the family over political power and its preponderance in the economy has over the years led to the development of a substantial sector of the bourgeoisie that recognised that Somoza governed the conditions of their own existence but became increasingly belligerent about his control over competition, This group, various petty bour formed the Broa Front (FAO) early to respond to mobilisation and their own interests somoza era.

• Split Since the outbreak of full civil war at the end of August the FAO has split, and a more 'militant' faction that rejects US mediation has formed the National Patriotic Front (FNP).

This group recognises that 'somozismo without Somoza' is quite insufficient to contain the masses, and it has pursued a more radical nationalist and reformist campaign.

'This has enabled it to ally itself with the guerrillaist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) that is leading the mass struggle against Somoza.

It is in shifting ailiances such as this that the Nicaraguan Somoza the rules of allied with geois sectors, I Opposition in 1978 both the mass to protect for the postrevolution, like all revolutions, goes beyond the simplicity of military confrontation and is in reality a political struggle on several fronts, ever fluid yet always critical.

This is no less true for the FSLN itself. At the height of the insurrection in September last year the Sandinistas were in the process of uniting three internal groupings that had existed for several years.

The capture of the government palace in the capitai Managua in August, the subsequent uprisings in the cities of Leon, Estell and Masaya, and the war without quarter that followed impelled such a unification.

However, the differences between the factions are sufficiently great to have major implications for the political process of the revolution even before the removal of Somoza.

Insurrection

Only two factions of the FSLN claim to be marxist-leninist: the Guerra Popular Prolongada (GPP) and the Tendencia Proletaria (TP).

These two groups had a longstanding dispute over the strategy of insurrection. The GPP preferred an extended rural campaign, while the TP argued for the necessity of organisation of the urban masses before an armed uprising.

This dispute has now been resolved, as is evident from the co-ordination of urban guerrilla activity and strike action with major military operations in the north and on the Costa Rican border.

Position adopted

It would appear that the TP is now virtually non-existent, but it is clear that its position has been adopted by the GPP.

The major differences within the FSLN are not, however, over military strategy but over politics and specifically between the GPP and the 'Terceristas' (Third Party).

The Terceristas faction acquired its name through mediating between the other FSLN groups but it has now become the largest section and its leadership is almost entirely comprised of social democrats.

The Terceristas • have endeavoured to subordinate all political differences and discussion to the task of removing Somoza.

The dropping of an ideological identification from the Sandinistas programme is, of course, ideal for the Terceristas' aim.

They seek only a platform around which they can draw optimum support from the middle classes and petty bourgeoisie, retain the support of the masses and yet restrict the movement towards a full social revolution.

Broader base

There is no doubt that the unification has broadened the base of opposition . and facilitated great advances in organising the battle to topple Somoza.

In this sense it bears all the hall marks of the operation of a united front.

Nevertheless, it is the Terceristas who hold the commanding influence, the cash, and recognition by Venezuela, Mexico and ( )sta Rica, along with having the main national leaders, and the critical alliance with the bourgeoisie.

The class nature of the theretore remains concealed and is constantly repressed.

On the other hand, the GPP has been to the fore in organising popular resistance, particularly in Esteli and Leon, key centres in the struggle.

Moreover, the extreme brutality of the war (at least 3,000 dead since September) and the very rapid rise in popular mobilisation have brought about a movement that is increasingly challenging not just Somoza but the entire system that preserved him in power and imposed such wretched deprivation upon the masses.

Hence, the experience of the last year poses a grave threat to the popular frontism of the Terceristas and a great political challenge to the "marxists" in the FSLN.

Hanging on The waging of the war remains the most bitter and immediate task. Several times Somoza's fall has been confidently predicted but he has still been able to hang on.

Sandinista guerrilla There is no doubt that this is partly because the US has been unable to cajole him out of office or hit on a satisfactory alternative that would not provoke further mass mobilisation.

The contradictions of imperialism extend to the fact that at the time of the crisis the US ambassador in Managua was an inept emigre who was amadad the mant her Montre fam awaruta Ine post py varter tor delivering the Cuban vote in Miami in the presidential election.

He was much more disposed to playing pokerwith Somoza than booting him out of office.

in the main, though, Somoza's survival to date has been facilitated by the simple balance of class forces.

Whilst he is able to rely on the National Guard, which has recently received a 50% pay ninn ha ann rantiai ta finht a rearguard action. own substantial property, but this would provide them with scant relief.

In the last year unemployment has risen from 45% to 65%. In 1977 growth in GNP was 5.5%; in 1978 it was minus The foreign debt stands at 75% of GNP and the rise in the cost of living for 1979 is forecast to be at least 50%.

In the face of this and the extensive mobilisation of the masses it is hard to imagine how any regime that does not undertake basic reforms could survive without engendering further To date the Guard has proved loyal and the FSLN strategy of capturing towns and then holding out against the counter-offensive has been unsuccessful-just as the general strikes of the spring of: 1978 were insufficient without armed support from the guerrillas.

These lessons have been learnt and in the last two weeks the new revolutionary offensive has combined the strategies.

The FSLN has taken the towns of Leon and Jinotega in the north at the same time as opening a major attack from the Costa Rican border while the urban proletariat has declared a general strike in Mangua.

The current offensive came to a head over the weekend of June 2nd 3rd with Managua brought to a standstill on Monday the 4th.

It remains to be seen whether this will be enough to dislodge Somoza, but it is crystal clear that he will go before long.

This will undoubtedly be a heroic and substantial victory for the Nicaraguan masses. But the political battle will be far from over. We need only look at Iran to• grasp this basic lesson of the overthrow of absolutism.

Trotskyist party

It is on this basis that we must continue to give our fullest support to the anti-imperialist Struggles of the masses of Central America and within that support fight for a Trotskyist political leadership that extends the war to an assault on the economic, social and political structure of capitalism.

It is only in this way that the imperialist united fronts Somoza's troops on the streets

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DE NICA, NICARAGUA