[mpr xer n tl Ipp: the Am In…]

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mpr xer n tl Ipp: the Am In f whe fore retr dor bart dict rest the hav mal per wO:

gua tot: Trc wit rial tio po sin tre thi 'cised an influence le international class ggle out of all portion to the arent significance of small Central erican stait.

his is evident not only Central America itself, re the U.S. has been ed to organise a OrmISI Coup I Lt sura .....int" man in Fl Calvaand isolate the parous Guatemalan atorship, but also in the of Latin America where effects of the revolution e been particularly rked and herald a new iod in the struggle of the rking class.

Besides inIs, lie iveasa 1hin the Nirarain revolution has caused al havoc inside the world stskyist movement, cipitating a major split hin the United Secretat of the Fourth Internanal - on the basis of sitions that range from aply wrong to downright acherous adaptation to e FSLN leadership.

In such a situation the task of Marxists is to fight tenaciously for the political independence of the proletariat.

It is fundamental to Marxism that the inherent characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie is to oscillate between the two historic classes-the capitalist class and the working class.

When a petty. bourgeois political formation such as the FSLN takes power, whether it be on the basis of the smashing of the old bourgeois state or not, it is pulled violently from side to side and is unable to establish a stable, class-based state.

This tendency is even more pronounced in the neo-colonial countries, and presents us with a historical anomaly in terms of the Leninist theory of the state.

It is, in short, a transitory phenomenon; an• intermediate period, shot through with contradictions. There existed certain factions within the FSLN which, had there been the necessary external material ~ onlitical support. could, revolutionary attack by imperialism, have swung towards the working class.

Castro's petty bourgeois nationalist July 26 Movement, in a developing economic/military alliance with the Kremlin bureaucracy, carried through such a turn in Cuba, resulting in the emergence of a deformed workers' state.

The cadre of the Guerra Popular Prolongada (GPP) tendency had been in the campo for an extended period (in some cases nearly twenty years), had lost many of its organic ties with the bourgeoisie and cultivated a ferocious antagonism towards the pro-imperialist state despite being immersed in the fundamental elitism of guerrillaism.

Equally the Tendencia Proletaria (TP) had moved away from the strategy of rural guerrilla warfare and rejected vague catch all political formulations based on the people' and the 'working masses'.

'Leninist"

This tendency openly attacked the others for failing to develop a coherent revolutionary strategy on the basis of building a party in the working. class, and declared itself to be 'Leninist' , (Tendencia Proletaria, Documentos Basicos, 1 November 1978).

It cannot therefore, be said that these forces were from the outset lost to the socialist revolution.

But in practice their numbers were small, and since the GPP was differentiated primarily through its adherence to a particular military strategy and the leading cadre of the TP was composed almost exclusively of intellecutals, they lacked the ability to counterpose a programmatic or organisational challenge to the dominant third tendency-the Terceristas.

This faction came into being on the basis of a popular " frontist alliance with the anti-Somoza Nicaraguan which along with the Latin bourgeoisie American 'social democracies' (Venezuela, Costa Rica, Panama) gave substantial financial backing and prompted rapid recruitment on the basis of *anti somocismo' This rapidly put the Terceristas in a strong enough position to impose their hegemony over the other tendencies. through OlilC1 'unification' early in 1979.

Tied to capitalism

Thus, as the FSLN entered the final battle with Somoza and imperialism, it was still committed and tied to a dissident element of the capitalist class.

But the political definition of the revolution depended on the process of the revolution itself; the social dislocation of civil war, extensive. mass mobilisation, and the apparent smashing of the capitalist state apparatus.

Moreover, was apparent that the role played by imperialism would be absolutely critical.

The U.S. pursued an erratic policy towards Somoza in the last month's.

First it cut aid, then restored it; next it threw its resources behind the National Guard after the dictator announced his resignation in an attempt to reach a negotiated settlement with the bourgeois opposition-whilst simultaneously pushing the reactionary Organisation of American states to carry through a military intervention. the enormous destruction inflicted during the fighting, which made aid the most efficacious political weapon. As U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Chris topher, stated:

"With aid the chances will be enhanced [that the revolution] will move in the direction of a democratic regime • If we walk away we will almost certainly assure what we don't want, a communist or Cuban regime'.

Lessons of Cuba

Offers were made, requests encouraged, full promises held back and small quantities released to entice and threaten the new Government of National Reconstruction (GNR).

The lessons of Cuba had been learnt-there was to be no all-out blockade or any move to rehash the invasion attempt which led in Cuba to the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

This was a crucial turn by the U.s. imperialists, and the Junta responded rapidly and emphaticallythe bourgeoisie through instinct and the FSLN through its innate inability to present a coherent alternative.

Nevertheless it is significant that at the height of the war, Barricada, the official FSLN daily paper, was already laying the basis for a turn to the U.S. by quoting without any comment, Vance's| pronouncement of the imperialist policy:

•We must not let ourselves get carried away by the myth that by stimulating changes and by having relations with the forces of change, we can only help radicalisation . . When we stimulate democratic change, economic and social justice, we promote our own long-term interests, including those related to our security'.

(Barricada June 27 1979) After the victory the first logical step towards fortifying the middle way' was the inclusion of leading bourgeois figures in the GNR:

Far from employing these people discretely to

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RAG gaid weapon militia women Tomas

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