BOLIVIA: another coup in the making?

Scan page 2

As the two-million strong Bolivian electorate goes to the polls for the third time in as many years the international correspondents of the bourgeois press are once again gleefully serving • up the arithmetic of political instability: three elections, six presidents, two general strikes, three coups and (Socialist Press' own contribution, this) no less than seven attempted military putsches.

Gradually the message is getting home-that bourgeois democracy cannot work in Bolivia; that it has proved impossible to translate the constitutional and juridical apparatus nurtured over centuries in the imperialist metropolis to a superexploited neo-colonial state when the national bourgeoisie can be numbered only in hundreds and the only effective political forces are the military and the proletariat.

Since early 1978 the American State Department has sought to mediate the acute class conflict between these forces by pushing for a parliamentary regime 'in which the middle ground can find its voice:

But the workings of early bourgeois democracy are not only hopelessly anachronistic; they lack any historical roots or any social base in a country where 65% of the labour force are agricultural workers; where infant mortality is 33%; where in 1975 20% of the population existed on £30 per year; and where imperialist capital has developed a small but highly militant and superexploited proletariat.

Natusch The two year political crisis in Bolivia manifests this essential contradiction but also incorporates those of a secondary order: the temporary divergence of interests between the local repressive apparatus and monopoly capital; the 'internal' competition (sectarianism) natural to bourgeois party politics; and the revival of 'populism' which, in alliance with the trade union bureaucracy, has served to divert the combativity of the workers from the overthrow of the capitalist state to the defence of its liberal form.

All these elements have come to the fore in the most recent period since the removal of the 16-day Natusch dictatorship last November.

Their combination makes it not the outcome of Sunday's elections but the very real threat of a Pinochet-style coup that is the principal concern of revolutionary Marxists.

Setback

Although they suffered a major setback with the mass opposition and overthrow of the Natusch regime, the military 'hardliners' have greatly consolidated their position since November and their 'strong Soldiers action during the man' , army commander Gen. Garcia (nephew of President Lydia Gueiler) has made no bones about the fact that he wants an end to parliament and civilian rule.

This has led the military into conflict with the US embassy and the remarkable situation of the generals assailing the ambas/ Don sador as 'an imperialist viceroy' and denouncing great power intervention' which in May effectively suppressed a planned coup.

Survived

Gueiler appears to have scampered through and survived her term through deft manipulation and the of Washington.

However, she has been forced to delay implementing major IMF austerity plans and with the economy on the verge of collapse her successor, if able to avoid removal by the generals will be faced with a working class thát remains militant, is Gueiler takes office increasingly pauperised and yet demonstrably tiring of the parliamentary pantomime.

An indication of the crisis of capitalism in Bolivia is given by the fact that even the reformist-dominated COB has demanded a minimum wage of 12,000 Bolivars per month while 60% of the labour force is paid less than Bs 3,000.

With the national debt 100% higher in 1979 than in 1978 there is no considerable scope for conceding anything near this demand.

The man most likely to succeed to this problem is Siles Zuazo, leader of the left' MNR. He is allied to the pro-Moscow CP, the left social democratic MIR, and a variety of smaller Siles has the critical support of the Trotskyist' Vanguardia Obrera.

Pas Estenssore's opposing rightist coalition has lost ground since 1979 with his ill-designed support for the Natusch coup and the loss of the Christian Democrats.

Military backing

But Paz maintains a hold over important peasant groups and although former dictator General Hugo Banzer is standing yet again, Paz may expect some discreet aid from the military.

. In all some 13 slates, comprising 72 parties, entered the poll-a state of affairs that is certain to confuse the voters and perpetuate indecision.

However, aside from Banzer (who continues to hold an important constituency in the eastern capital Santa Cruz), the only other important challenger is Lechin, General Secretary of COB.

His PRIN alliance has won the backing of the POR (Combate-USFI), the OST (Morenists) and VCPOR (a section from the POR (Lora).

Most of these Trotskyist' parțies have switched their allegiance from the Socialist Party of Marcelo Quiroga, which now stands alone.

No illusions The number one priority for revolutionary Marxists is the political independence of the working class. This by no means necessarily requires abstention from elections but it certainly entails a rigorous denunciation of class alliance or the slightest illusion in bourgeois democracy for the fulfillment of the proletariat.

This is always the case, but in Bolivia it is the most immediate and transcendent requirement.

Support for Lechin who, though head of COB, has no mass party and, what is more, a 30-year history of betrayal cannot be defended in these terms.

While the Moscow and Peking Stalinists long ago threw in the towel (with Siles and Paz respectively) the partisans of Pabloism continue to be uncertain, shifting from one left talker to another, tottering on the cliffedge of popular frontism.