Bolivia: the Baci July Coup

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detailed political analysis put forward is not necessarily sha Miners at the Siglo XX mining camp: backbone of the resistance to the new dictatorship. It's clear that in order to reach a proper analysis of the July coup we have to understand the political developments of the previous two years. Can you features of that period? Principal We have to start before the fall of Banzer (in August 1978) with the hunger strike of late 1977 and early 1978 that obtained the political amnesty and concession of elections.

The hunger strike, begun by four mining women, was working class action, an independent action, at a time when the regime was in severe political and economic crisis.

Nevertheless, at certain moments in the previous seven years the working class had been fighting alongside the democratizing' faction of the bourgeoisie against dictatorship and for a general and unrestricted amnesty.

This partial victory was won in the spring of 1978, and won by the working class. But it also marked a period of displacement of the proletariat towards the politics of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie gained from the mobilisation which strengthened its electoralist strategy.

And the working class temporarily lost its political expression; it forgot its class independence in its support for formal democracy.

Thus, in the 1978 elections not only the majority of the workers but also most of the 'left' was to be found in the same trench as the 'democratic' faction of the bourgeoisie.

What, then, were the major forces in the 1978 elections?

The most important political formation was the Popular and Dy one veteran right linged Democratic Union veteran T190 wineer Hernan Siles Zuazo, allied with the pro-Moscow Communist Party (PCB) and the petty bourgeois MIR.

This was a large front and played a major role. In face of the political diversion of the working class towards mere antidictațorial positions, the UDP's programme for a bourgeois democratic state won a majority of working class support.

Further to the right there was the old MR, led by Victor Paz Estenssoro, who broadly represented the interests of imperialism.

In 1979 Paz was to acquire greater importance and under the Gueiler government his became virtually the official candidature. But in 1978 this role was played by General Pereda Asbun,. who drew resolute opposition from the proletariat, to whom the UDP appeared the only alternative.

There were attempts to form tusch a left front but these failed since the masses, by virtue of the fact they supported formal bourgeois democracy, couldn't see the point of a front led politically by the working class itself.

Nevertheless, some groups tried to differentiate themselves from the UDP and formed the Revolutionary Front of the Left (FRI). These Trotskyists and Maoists used a miner's wife and a peasant to represent them in the election. But if we look carefully at their programme they didn't go beyond bourgeois democracy themselves and the FRI was only a popular front.

After the debacle of the 1978 elections, the fraudulent poll, Pereda's éventual coup and then his overthrow by General Padilla with the call for fresh elections in 1979 it would appear that conditions were auspicious for the parties of the left to perceive their error. What happened in 1979?

The left groups all remained submerged in electoralism. Only the Revolutionary Workers Party (POR) presented an analysis of bourgeois democracy and showed that it was utterly impossible for it to exist in a backward capitalist country like Bolivia, that the leadership of the oppressed nation and the masses is the subject of a direct confrontation between the General Garcia imperialist bourgeoisie and the working class.

Because capitalism is in its last phase, the proletariat poses an increasing threat to the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeois1e.

The only alternative in the long-term in a backward country like Bolivia is either military dictatorship or a workers' and peasants' government.

The left' turned a deaf ear to this and threw itself with great energy into the elections.

Let us consider these forces in more detail. First, the pro-Moscow Stalinists who, as we know represent (at an international level) nothing less than the interests of the bourgeoisie.

In Bolivia the PCB also fulfills the task of interpreting and transmitting bourgeois interests.

Thus, it has consistently held the masses back and pulled them onto the electoral path.

The PCB is well represented on the COB (the Bolivian TUC) and this has made the task that much easier. The MIR, essentially a petty bourgeois force in both composition and programme, maintained similar line.

The pro-Peking Staliniststhe PCBM-L-(Pekineses), while they tried to present themselves as being further to the left by creating the FRI, simply presented another version of petty bourgeois reformism.

Programmatically they stood in line with the PCB and the UDP and in 1980 they moved even further to the right, supporting Paz in the June elections.

These parties shared the erroneous belief in a stagist programme, which made their actions perfectly logical.

Of increasing importance in 1979 and 1980 was the Socialist Party-One (PS-1) of the late Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz.

The PS-1 made a great effort to form a left front to represent working class interests but it still failed to supersede bourgeois democracy and, therefore, failed in its task.

It was unable to see that the proletariat had to head such a front with an independent class The electoralism of the PS-I made overwhelmingly clear by its leading role in the National Committee for the Defence of Democracy (CONADE), set up after the assassination of left wing editor Luis Espinal in April.

CONADE's activity was limited to organising the masses against the military and its only demands were for free and fair • Against this, the POR fought for the creation of armed defence groups against the fascist terror. But such demands made only very limited headway within CONADE.

All the reformist and bourgeois parties were in it, including the right wing PRA of Walter Guevara. Eventually the PS-1's capitulation to CONADE's minimal aims lost it even its reputation of being on the left wing of ; the organisation; even the MIR was further to the left.

I should say that, contrary to some reports, the POR ințervened in CONADE but never formally joined it and, in fact, left when it was required to sign the programme.

But here we are going too fast.

The most important thing to recognise at this point was that the electoralism of all the major political parties led directly to the chaos of November 1979.

At that stage the central government-presided over by Guevara who had been elected Siles by parliament-was highly unstable and threatened, on the one hand by increasing mass mobilisation and, on the other, by the military.

The eventual coup, headed by Natusch, was an act of desperation on the part of the armed forces in an effort to replace a thoroughly weak government, and the result was a further acceleration in the mobilisation of the masses.

Can we look more closely at the Natusch coup and its effects? It seems to have marked an absolutely critical point in the development of the class struggle over this period and has now been overshadowed by the successful Garcia coup.

The coup led to an extraordinary radicalisation of the working class and the peasantry, which drew in behind them many members of the urban middle class. / At this point the proletariat broke from its diversion towards bourgeois politics-as is very clear from the continuation of the general strike.

The masses held the solution to the crisis in their hands. However the leadership entered into a treacherous agreement with the army and parliament.

Lechin [leader of the COB] called the strike off; the miners and peasants rejected his call and continued. But the 'agreement' with the bourgeoisie which was the result of the crisis (and confirmed the immovable fidelity of the 'left' to bourgeois democracy) turned a potentially revolutionary situation into a partial victory for the bourgeoisie.

Natusch was simply replaced by a transitional regime (that of Gueiler); the right wing remained intact, and the military's aim to smash the working class definitively was unaltered. They continued to prepare for this.

I should stress the very important role played by the peasantry. Late in November, after the fall of Natusch, the peasants increased their mobilisation and re-established road blocks in demand for fair prices for their produce.

Meanwhile the COB actively demobilised the workers-and the result was i complete lack of co-ordinatior between the two sectors agains Gueiler's economic package.

There was confusion anc backslipping in the cities anc the strike was restricted to thr countryside.

Nevertheless, November har given us an example of how ; worker peasant allaince migh operate. For example, is Colquiri the POR was able tr achieve a local alliance whicl was firmly pledged to a prolet arian programme.

November also demonstrater very clearly that the only wa! to defeat the golpistas (putsch ists) is the mobilisation of thi masses against the reformist treacherous politics of the tradi union leadership-not thi actions of parliament.

The position of the COB wa very clear —it refused at the star to declare an indefinite genera strike. Instead it announced thi formation of a "Democrati Anti-Fascist Committee"

The POR fought for al immediate strike call, based ol independent class positions; bu all the left turned a deaf ear tr this. It was only when the COl headquarters itself was attacker that they called the strike.

The effect of this period or the workers was enormous When the POR later called fo the setting up of anti-fascis defence committees there was. large response which deriver directly from the experience o the struggle against Natusch.

In view of this and the lon tradition of Trotskyism il Bolivia it is remarkable tha there was not joint action between those parties claimin to be Trotskyist in order te build on the revolutionar mobilisation of the workers are peasants and break them from illusions in bourgeois des Yes. But you have to use stand that almost all o: t groups that claim to be 110. ist have, in fact, compics abandoned the revolubor They followed the the reformist parties.

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¡GROUND TO THE Murdered by junta: Socialist Party leader Quiroga tives was through the Revolu- became increasingly obvious tionary Anti-Imperialist Front that it was Garcia, as army (FRA). commander, who was Out of the ashes of effectively in control. re-establish the FRA in order to coup the whole time and there unify the oppressed nation were numerous false alarms. At under the leadership of the the same time the reformists ssed Bolivian working class za which came to power in a permanent and crushing ırking class. The following evolutionary Party (POR) way for such a coup. The by Socialist Press .

Vanguardia Comunista first ¡joined the FRI and then that broke up. Vanguardia Obrera, led by Fileman Escobar, went to the extreme of supporting the UDP in the last election.

The OST (Organizacion Socialista de los Trabajadores, linked to the Party Commission) also joined the FRI; but when Lechin retired from the race they were also forced to lend their support to the popular Likewise the POR (Combate), the USFI's section. Again, having put all their faith in Lechin, they were totally disoriented when he withdrew.

Now, none of these groups emerged from a profound split , in the POR although the Pabloites left as a result of the 1953 crisis. None posed an alternative programme--they all tail-ended behind the PCB and PCBM-L.

Only the POR which represents Trotskyism in Bolivia, continued to hammer away at the point that bourgeois democracy was a cul de-sac and that the only way to orientate the masses towards their own objecNovember we had to fight to working class.

If we move forward somewhat to the months before Garcia's coup, it appears that the POR had two distinct positions at the same time-one open, public and expansionist, the other effectively clandestine, orientated towards underground work. In terms of organisation alone this appears somewhat confusing but, perhaps more important, it seems to reflect the lack of a decisive political analysis.

Yes, of course that's how it appeared. But one must remember the very distinct conditions that obtained in the spring and early summer.

While the Gueiler regime nominally ruled the country it We were on the verge of a and the left' continued to mobilise for the elections.

There existed two very different possibilities and we couldn't say with confidence that one or the other would occur. When, in April, the military came into etiective control, the POR called for the complete abandonment of electoral politics, and the organisation of the masses against fascism.

The 'left' paid no attention. We had to respond to that, even though we argued that a coup was extremely likely either before or after the poll. Moreover, we had to use the electoral campaign to show our position was right.

Therefore, we campaigned for a politically-motivated blank vote which not only repudiated reformism but responded to the increasing degree of abstentionism evident after the failure of the 1978 and 1979 elections. At the same time we continued to build defence committees and called for a general strike. The fact that the 'left' would have nothing to do with this meant that, in contrast to November, the July coup was faced with a disorganised and demobilised working class and peasantry.

But this was not the only difference was it?

No. There were several differences. Natusch lacked internal and international support. Externally, Natusch was completely isolated.

Garcia was also faced with international opposition-but he received direct help from the dictatorships of the Southern Cone. Not just recognition but material and ideological support.

We now know of the importance of the Argentinian 'advisors' and the paramilitary forces in the first days of the coup.

Natusch was not endeavouring to establish a Pinochet-style coup; but Garcia had planned one from the very beginning.

This was reflected in the lack of confidence in the Junior Officers, who were rarely used for important operations.

Also the social conditions were entirely different in July. The working class and peasantry was largely demobilised. In many areas there was no peasant resistance.

In the cities there was very tight control. The barricades lasted only two or three days. In the mines the resistance was of an entirely different characterthe workers had no choice but to take up their arms and fight.

But in the towns the union leadership was effectively decapitated-the attack on the COB and the killing or capture of the leaders indicated the intentions of Garcia from the very start.

The organisation of resistance around the mining areas and the extraordinary violence that this engendered made the opposition to the dictatorship Mass meeting of Bolivian miners essentially proletarian in character, despite Lechin's treason in calling for an end to the general strike.

The miners showed enormous heroism in defending their workplaces and this, in the end, meant that they weren" smashed but were able to retreat with some guarantees.

Nevertheless they remain almost totally isolated from the rest of the population.

The offensive against the miners, the vanguard of the proletariat, was the armed forces' forces py incipa preese tion: OUT also repressed other sections in their endeavour to subdue the slightest manifestation of opposition.

These included the Church, the left and democratic parties, the Permanent Assembly Human Rights. Their actions were typical of fascists and the cruelty with which they were undertaken was also highly characteristic.

I myself was arrested as the searched for the leadership of the left, detaining and interrogating as many people as they Political or dee the Department of Political was full of political prisoners as were offices of the General stait a Miranores and mne Ministry ol the Interior.

The whole offensive seemed to be modelled on Pinochet's, even down to use of the stadium.

It was all carefully prepared, they had learnt the lessons of November. They knew exactly what to do and how to do it. It was crucial to the military to use Lechin as their instrument, he was key to demobilising the masses. His television broadcast calling off the strike was the culmination of his treacherous career; he is neutred as a political and union leader.

He said he would explain later but this has been met with widespread scépticism and the workers have been shown with the utmost clarity the reactionary role that the COB can play.

Of course, the impact is not restricted to workers. The paramilitary forces have been assisted by undercover agents who • Page 7 have begun a massive purge in the public sector from directors of national corporations to rural school teachers.

Anyone with left connections is being fired. The dictatorship has decided to retain power whatever the consequences.

Faced with this situation the left in this country and apparently elsewhere too, while it calls for the overthrow of the dictatorship also demands the "restoration of democracy'. At a meeting in London addressed by Domitila Barrios there was a banner saying Bolivia demands democracy'. Clearly the task of fighting for a clear break from bourgeois democracy is far from completed. Nevertheless, this still remains the most "obvious' demand, the most popular and accessible point of mobilisation -however futile history has shown it to be for the neocolonial countries. How, in concrete terms, are revolutiona Marxists to fight against it? What is the way forward in Bolivia?

We always run the risk of sounding repetitious on this point but, in view of the social and political cost incurred in my country by the failure of the left to learn this fundamental lesson, it has to be restatedthere is absolutely no way forward for the masses with bourgeois democracy. None whatsoever.

What we must fight for is the political independence of the proletariat in the leadership of the oppressed nation. This does not mean we don't fight for democratic guarantees and liberties-of course we must.

Now, for example, the junta says the 1967 Constitution is in force. We must fight for the rights contained in that Constitution against the army's whim -which is what is actually what determines the parameters of 'politics'. At the same time we must build up the economic defences of the working class.

It's clear that Garcia is planning a political economy based on devaluation and with Bolivia's massive foreign debt, lack of reserves and falling production, this will fall on the working class.

Internationally, it is clear that the non-recognition of Bolivia by the USA is qualitatively different from that of oppressed nations, such as those of the Andean Pact.

Imperialism will always fulfil its historical role of denying oppressed nations their liberation. Thus the present conjuncture is only temporary. A Reagan victory would clear the path to recognition and support for a fascist government Bolivia.

The revolutionary party must always maintain an anti-imperialist stance, under whatever conditions. When the US warned against a coup in the spring the POR maintained its independence and denounced both imperialism and the golpistas; now we will fight against both imperialism and dictatorship.

We do not take the same attitude towards the non-recognition of other oppressed nations, nor, of course, of the masses. We recognise that it is only through militant proletarian international solidarity that not only the Bolivian dictatorship but also the others in Latin America and elsewhere will be overthrown.

But such solidarity will only be constructed through the mobilisation of the working class in pursuit of its own objectives by revolutionary parties.

In this sense the coup in Bolivia is one more indication of the overwhelming need for the reconstruction of the party of world revolution.

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