Workers Socialist League

Socialist Press, Trotskyism Today and the Trotskyist International Liaison Committee, 1975–1984

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Socialist Press no. 227, 10 December 1980 · scan pp. 7–8 · about 1,630 words

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Beneath a cover of nationalist frenzy in their demands for import controls, British trade union leaders are in full-scale collaboration with management at British Leyland and other British car firms -assisting in the imposition of closures, speed-up and pay sell-outs like the recent betrayal at BL. It is interesting therefore to examine the parallel problems of leadership which confront Japanese workers at the giant Nissan (Datsun) corporation. We reprint below extracts from an investigation by Yamamoto Kiyoshi of Tokyo University into 'Labour-Management Relations at Nissan Motor Co. Ltd.' russ long-term and biannual ns; a sectional meeting on duction which meets approx¡tely twice a year as a means communication between ¡pany executives and union cutives on matters having to vith production for the comy as a whole; a production on conference held once. a ith. between company and an officers actually in charge perations to decide the probon schedule for the month; consultations on the details he production system held F a month at the plant level iscuss how to implement the tions made at the "producliaison conference". * is especially noteworthy JLC I2IV In-markotMatoen.nu nela Duit not vuwur on sale in that concrete decisions on such matters as the size of the required workforce, working hours and intensity of labour are made at the plant level "consultation on the details of the production system" c) The system of "proposals" on personnel affairs: Unique among the three components of the structure of labour-management relations at Nissan is the system for "proposals" on personnel affairs.

Under this system, the company. makes concrete "proposal" to and obtains a "consent" from the union regarding which union members should be promoted to which specific managerial and supervisory posts.

Although the general principles of personnel policies are a subject of discussion at the central consultative meeting, the company seeks the union's consent on exactly "who" should be promoted to "which" posts.

Unilateral authority This system presents a sharp contrast with the dominant pattern of postwar Japanese labour-management relations. In most cases, management has had unilateral "authority over per•management rights part of its sonnel affairs"

This system for "proposals" on personnel affairs extends from the "appointment" ..of workers with responsible positions and their "transfer", to promotion of irregular employees to regular employees.

In administering the system for "proposal" on personnel affairs, the company gives priority to personnel management based on operational needs and the skills of the workers concerned.

However, the union insists that personnel policies should give utmost priority to "one's record of union activities" and "one's standing in the union hierarchy" (which supposedly serves as an indicator of "leadership capacity").

What is more, the company's "proposal" is often opposed, rejected and replaced by a counter-proposal from the union: The union tries to gain influence in the company by putting "former Standing Committee members" not only in the posts of low-ranking supervisors but even in the ranks of "company executives"

At the same time, the fact that those active in the union are given priority in promotion in the company's hierarchy is used by the union as powerful leverage to induce the rank and file members to pledge loyalty to the union.

Concealed

However, how this system is implemented and what criteria are involved are concealed from ordinary union members.

Decisions are made behind closed doors through negotiations between top union officers and management. In this sense, the "proposal" system is hardly an opening wedge for the workers to encroach upon the "management rights" through autonomous activities.

It is simply a convenient way for a handful of union leaders to impinge on "management right" as it exists under the present economic system. 3. Changes since the 1973 Oil Crisis.

As we have seen above, the structure of labour-management relations at Nissan Motor is substantially different from the standard organisational arrangements of industrial democracy.

High growth

Yet in the period of extremely high growth for the Japaneșe automotive industry and Japanese capitalism • as a whole which lasted from 1955 up till the oil crisis, various contradictions inherent in this peculiar labour-management relationship at Nissan were not brought out into the open.

However, the sharp changes in the economic environment that have been ushered in by the oil crisis of November 1973 have begun to shake this relationship.

i is lue midl lne siructural It is true that tha ntwrak.ut arrangements have not yet explicitly changed. Yet underneath its unchanged facets, we can clearly identify various changes taking place in labourmanagement relations. a) An end to "full attainment of the increase demanded": 1) The "wage struggle" is central to collective bargaining at Nissan, but "full attainment of the increase demanded" is no longer the rule.

union managed to attain all its demands. Since 1975 it has been able to obtain only between 55 and 80% of the wage hike proposed.

The old system of "full *The Rate of Wage "Wage Struggles" a Increase in Rate of wage increases attained by "wage struggles"

Rate of increase

in real wages 1970 are the days of rising attainment of the demanded increase" has ceased to function.

2) Previously, collective bargaining was concluded with only two meetings, but the number of meetings has steadily increased: 3 times in 1973; 4 times in 1974; and 5 times in 1975, 1977 and 1978 without including the negotiations held between FJAWU chairman Shoji and the executive officers of the Nissan Workers' Union and the company executives.

3) The wage increases achieved through these prolonged negotiations are drastically different from earlier years. An increase in real wages of more than 10% per year, which was once a reality, is now almost impossible.

Especially since 1975, the union has barely managed to prevent a decline in real wages.

Whatever increases have been attained through the "wage struggles" are only intended to compensate for that portion of real wages which are daily eroded by soaring inflation.

b) Movement for union participation in management: A significant change is also taking place in the way consultation is conducted. Consultation activities since 1955 have been geared primarily to the improvement of labour productivity.

Needless to say, the objective of-improved labour productivity was the curtailment of costs.

But in the process of high economic growth, cost reduction was achieved only as a byproduct of rapid investment in facilities.

In striking contrast, however, since the oil crisis the reduction of costs has become a major objective, as evidenced by the "Movement, for Cost Reduction" now underway at Nissan. And efforts are being stepped up to mobilise the workers ideologically toward this end.

The most typical example of such ideological mobilisation is the "3-P Movement" (the 3 Ps stand for productivity, participation and prosperity).

What is noteworthy about this movement is that in its implementation special emphasis is placed on the ideology of "participation"

Now that real wages have ceased to increase, it is no longer possible to whip up and maintain the morale of the workers by means of economic incentives.

Motivation

Thus, in order for the company to mobilise the workers effectively for more efficient operation, it must motivate the workers by other means. This is where the ideology of workers' participation management comes in. c) The system of "proposals" on personnel affairs: The future of the system of "proposals" on personnel affairs is also Con of increase nsumer prices I March of the ding year)

real Increases Attained b Nissan a the Pric wages in Datsun uncertain. In the period of high economic growth, when new plants were built one after another and the scale of operations steadily expanded and created additional posts for managers and supervisors, the situation was quite favourable for union participation in personnel affairs.

Under the new situation, where openings for such executive posts no longer increase rapidly, thereby shutting up the opportunities of promotion for many workers, the union wil find it increasingly difficult to intervene effectively into personnel policies.

Closed doors

Workers are sure to demand that promotion should be based on more impartial and equitable standards. In the face of such a demand, the system as it is practiced today behind closed doors and with priority given to union leaders will inevitably be modified.

In fact, the union's policy on personnel affairs does not command much support from the rank and file members. It cannot withstand the company's policy of controlling personnel administration as part of its efforts to rationalise management and strengthen the managerial hierarchy.

Ever since the oil crisis, labour-management relations at Nissan Motor have undergone some profound changes. The economic environment. has institutional framework for Hus titu culd SuanseWOk labour-management relations, ie., collective bargaining over wage increases, consultation, and the system of "proposals" on personnel affairs, are all changing.

system But what specific form the new system of labour-management relations will take is still anybody's guess.

This will depend on a set of factors including: the type of personnel management policy to be instituted by president Ishihara of Nissan Motor who is gaining increased control over the company's management in place of board chairman Kawamata; the activities of rank and file union members in opposition to the present union leadership; and the way union leaders exercise control over discontented elements.

However these and other factors develop, labour-management relations based on "mutual confidence" , which Nissan has been so proud of for a quarter of a century, now face a turning point.

NEXT WEEK The economic exploitation of Datsun workers Reprinted from Tokyo University's Annals of the Institute of Social Science, no 21. '

Scan page 8

immigrants West the late 50s.

This last brought Mos into direct continuity with 1 present day fascist organi tions.

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It was only till the spring "wage struggle" in 1974, the year after the oil crisis, that the

← Contents of Socialist Press no. 227, 10 December 1980