Town Clerks' Plan for Dicfatorship
Socialist Press1981 1981-04-16Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 4 →
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In its 20 March 1981 issue. New Statesman described tne contents ut anto nf a secret Home Office circular to local authorthe arrangements for the recovery period after a nuclear attack on Britain.
Subsequently New Statesman has made available the complete text of the secret circular.
The appearance of this material is an important event for those who are concerned to make a serious study of the state's plans for its own survival. It shows a number of new' aspects of state planning which were not previously known.
The circular is numbered ES 3/1976. ES is an abbreriation for Emergency Series. The complete size of the ES series is not known, but it is widely believed that at least 11 have been produced.
Not all of these are directed at local government. Similar plans are made for the nationalised industries, the police and the health and water services.
The first point to be noted about this circular is that it is by now quite old;
the material may be as much as ten years old. Certainly it predates the 1979 Home Defence Review which has led to widespread revisions in emergency planning.
It may well be that the New Statesman was only able to obtain the document because it is now superceded by more detailed material.
Nonetheless it is the most un to date guide to this area ot government unus: "The tort heoins with the injunction against communicating the information in the circular to the press or to any person not specifically authorised to receive it.
It emphasises that during 'normal peacetime' recipients of the circular should not even need to pass on the information in it to their own deputies or assistants, except on a strict need to know' basis.
This is notable because the Chief Executives of local authorities are of course employed by elected councils, to whom they should be answerable.
However when it comes to secret Home Office circulars we find that the Chief Executive keeps these plans from the councils who pay him and provide him with the resources to draw up his local war plans.
Light of day
So successful has this secrecy been that a 1976 circular has only now seen the light of day, despite the fact that copies were in the Town Halls of every local authority, including the most militant left Labour councils.
The first section of the circular deals with the problems of 'law and order' after a nuclear attack. Recognising that 'conditions of anarchy' would prevail, the writer, i MI J.F.D. Buttery, states that an essential task for the wartime regional government would be to establish and maintain public order, using the police and armed forces.
A new system of courts would be set up to cope with the problems of a devastated Britain.
Thaca new courts. according to the Home Office, would have much greater powers than peacetime courts. There is nothing conditional or hesitant about this statement, no might have' or 'could have', but a complete certainty.
This must mean that the writer is fully aware of the powers which the emergency government will have. To be as confident as he obviously is about these powers he must also be sure that they will be arranged through some process other than Parliament.
No civil servant, however senior can ever be truly confident of the parliamentary process in the way that Mr Buttery is about the emergency powers.
Obviously Mr Buttery knows that the powers of the emergency government will never be approved by elected representatives of the people, and will be passed as Orders in Council' with the approval of a handful of cabinet ministers and the monarch.
In its description of the likely operation of the emergency courts the circular tells us more than it intends.
While stating that its main targets would be The anti-social conduct of individuals which seriously interfered with the essentials of the life of the community' it is in some doubt about exactly what behaviour can be considered anti-social in conditions of total devastation: It is grimly amusing to read how the senior civu servant attempts to com terms with this problem.
However, at a time the paramount aim woul survival, certain con which would be regardi anti-social in peacetime the occupation of el dwellings, or the apprc tion of unused chatte one's own use) might wi condoned, provided tha act did not involve ence ...
In other words, forces of the state woul set out to protect thost had provided them with shelter and Su! fróm squatters and loo provided these gangs not seeking to overthro existing government, st it would be.
Regional Commiss would be enabled unde circular to make any necessary with leade gangs of homeless and ing-provided they mai ed themselves in positi public authority and d allow the developme the system that had to the war.
But there will be r glove' treatment for who incur the displeas the Chief Executive missioner after the i attack. The delicat Buttery notes that:
"In conditions in death, destruction and were commonplace, penalties as probatior or sentences of im ment would no lon effective in dealing wi social offenders.
Such nenalties a! le to when Id be duct ed as mpty ›priaIs to ell be it the violthe d not = who selves pplies iterswere iw the ich as ioners er this deals :TS of starvintainons of lid not int of against led up 10 kid those sure of :/Comnuclear te Mr which I injury such 1, fines prisoniger be th antimunal labour, restricted rations and exposure to public disapproval might be appropriate for all but the gravest offences, but in the case of flagrantly anti-social behaviour there might be a need for harsher penalties than would be generally acceptable in peacetime."
Or in plain English, your local town clerk can arrange to have you shot!
And of course Mr Buttery is at pains to assuȚe the Commissioner that ne need have no doubt about his ability to be 'decisive'.
If there are any judges or JPs left alive in his area he can bring them into his court, but if not they will not be needed because if necessary a Commissioner sitting alone would still constitute a court'.
In order to allay the rears 11 - - 11- fanan of the most democratically inclined of the UnleI Exa- Norin utives/Commissioners Buttery informs us:
"In capital cases, whereever practicable, there would be a jury of not more than five, empowered summarily, less than three commission- or a court cunsong v' !. ananéstins of not Concluding this tactfully written section he assures the tremulous Chief Execu tive that:
appeals, but the senior com- "Thara wnnid he no iI... LIVIN missioner would make arrangements to review decisions of the emergency courts in his area.
Turning from such painful matters to the real business of survival and recovery for the ruling class, the next section of the circular looks at the use of surviving industrial resources' The obvious priority would be to assess the power supplies in the Commissioner's region, and to decide on how they should be used.
Any stocks of supplies, manufactured goods productive machinery would have to be identified and plans drawn up for the reestablishment of production at whatever level would be pessible.
A special problem would be transport and communications, and Commissioners would have to make hard decisions about which areas of housing, if any in their areas merited any attempts at repair or reconstruction.
Badly damaged areas however would not be completely written off by Mr Buttery and his Commissioners. 66 .. the main activity in these areas, when radiological • conditions permitted movement into them.
would be the salvaging ol usable building materials."
Encouraging news no doubt for those who live in the big cities, they will not be entirely useless. They will not of course be rescued, but their property may be sal vaged after their deaths.
Now all of these grandiose plans for recovery require a workforce. Mr Buttery is no fool. He is aware that:
"In spite of heavy casualties among the able-bodied population, there should be no general shortage of manpower, since industry, as it existed before the attack, would be virtually at a standstill."
The • Commissioners' problems are not so easily solved however. With little or no electircal power available, there will be a return to heavy manual labour both in industrial recovery work and in agriculture. The compassionate Mr Buttery observos that:
"With insufficient food and no balanced diet available, there would be an added reluctance to undertake heavy or unpleasant work."
Problems But this reluctance must not be allowed to stand in the way of the work of restoration of industry. MI Buttery reminds Commissioners that they will have powers to "direct' labour.
There might be some problems, he concedes, in the absence of effective sanctions: but the Commissioner would have charge of all the available food and medicine, and ought to be able to devise some local scheme to keep the hungry workers going.
In his closing paragraphs Mr Buttery faces the bureaucrat's nightmare full in the face, courageously.
The worst and most serious problem, he finally breaks it to the Commissioners, is that the monetary system would have collapsed as a result of even a minor nuclear attack.
It might take a year or even more, says the anxious Mr Buttery, to re-establish a national system of money.
Worse yet, the old money might have to be abandoned altogether, and never redeemed by the new Difficulties The intervening period would be full of difficulties for the Commissioner, but Mr Buttery and his civil servants have advice for the Commissioners even in such dire conditions:
"Regional Commissioners would be assisted in these monetary and other economic problems by financial advisers drawn from 'the Treasury and the private sector.
Many aspects of this kind of planning appear ludicrous, and may well prove to be wasted effort if the final crunch comes, but there are many possible forms of nuclear attack short of total destruction.
It may well be that t precautions will enhance survival chances of the r class and the bureauc during and after a nur war affecting Britain. 1 importantly, this kind secret planning is inex ably tied up with state ! for the repression of working class by force.
The establishment system of undemoc control linking togethe: military, the police anc bureaucracies of centra local government prese very serious concrete t to democratic right: Britain.
The embryonic forr the police state are created through these : emergency plans.
The Labour Party the trade unions inust every opportuniiy to d these developments expose them to public r ination.
Labour Councils publicly demand that officers reveal all secr culars from central g mént, and must refu vote money for war pla of any kind.
In London, Isl Council has already ar ced its intention to public the GLC war after it has censore names and addresses o and individuals. (It ha suggested that this F will leave very little document at all, but an issue to be faced the document appears Key role More Labour must follow this 1 approach, and rank a party members must home to their cou that this planning wo on in secret in ever!
hall.
Trade. unions mu take up this vital stri break up the syst the public sector unic a key role to pla A good example kind of initiative ne the resolution on the of the NAGLO annı ference this year cal an official NALGO gation into the invo of members in em planning, and thei quent exposure to checks and pressure action against fellow ists.
NALGO membe ensure that their co delegates are mand support this resolut to press for it to cussed in full confer Other public unionists should thought to drafting resolutions for th conferences.
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¡OCIALIST PRESS, Thursday 16 April, 1981 Page S
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