Repercussions of Angola

Scan page 3

SUBSCRIBE to ITAIN sues • issues issues response.

The impact of the MPLA victory in Angola continues to ripple across the continent of Africa. Nowhere is this more clearly shown than in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) where Nkomo, leader of the right wing faction that broke away from the main body of the nationalist movement last October to do a deal with Smith, has been forced to pull back.

Nkomo is now desparately trying to rescue what credibility he still has with the workers and peasants of Zimbabwe and Zambia.

ENCOURAGED

He has been overtaken by events. Encouraged by the victory in Angola that section of the nationalist movement which understood the necessity for guerrilla warfare to destroy Smith's settler regime has decisively broken from the policy of "Guerrilla war only if all else fails" forced on it by the leaders of the Black African states (notably president Kaunda of Zambia) as part of the 'detente" moves with South Africa.

Vorster has in any case had little noticeable effect in putting pressure on Smith to reach some sort of settlement with the nationalists.

The guerrilla movement has now consolidated itself in a new Zimbabwe Military High Command under the leadership of James Mugabe and it appears that not REST OF 6 issues. 12 issues 24 issues..

I would like to take Press. I would like.

NAME.

ADDRESS E and SEND to:

EUROPE

6 issues . 12 issues 24 issues E WORLD out a subscription to Si ... issues, I enclose 1 31, Dartmouth Park Hill, Lon only Nkomo, but also Bishop Muzorewa and the Rev. Sithole the 'radicals' from whom Nkomo split in October have also been excluded from the new military organisation.

As we emphasised in Socialist Press last October, Nkomo's split with the rest of the Nationalist leadership in Zimbabwe was aimed purely and simply at pulling off a compromise with Smith. By the middle of this month Nkomo had travelled a considerable distance down that road, conceding key points:

1. Nkomo was prepared to see the Rhodesian Civil Service remain under White control for the foreseeable future;

2. He gave considerable ground on the question of land tenure. This is vital to Smith since the whole economic basis of his settler regime is White control of the land and the forced exclusion of Africans from the rich agricultural land at present in the hands of Smith's gang of tobacco farmers.

3. But most important, Nkomo has reneged on the basic Nationalist demand of 'One man, One vote. He had put forward a system of separate voters' rolls with varying degrees of income level, education and 'good employment' record as the criteria for being allowed to vote.

While it is true that under Nkomo's scheme Blacks would have a majority in the Parliament this would only be the case if the Black vote did not split on any issue. Such situation would autotomatically increase the political power of the conservative TH £1.50 £3.00 £6.00 cialist FEMICOTRA African elements; the tribal chiefs, with whom Smith has been going out of his way over the last few months to secure an alliance against 'the menace of communism' The regime of Kenneth Kaunda Zambia has given every assistance to Nkomo in devising this betrayal of the African massess Zimbabwe. Kaunda has supplied all Nkomo's legal advisers and negotiators.

More important Kaunda silenced the 'left' elements in the Zimbabwe Smith nationalist leadership: Muzorewa Sithole, refugees in Zambia from Smith's police, refusing to even let them hold press conferences.

This is all part of Kaunda's deal with the South African Vorster regime. Vorster has since 1974 cultivated relations with African leaders like Kaunda to capture their countries as export markets for South African capitalism in the worsening world capitalist crisis.

South Africa over the last year, it is reported, has arrangea up to £71 million : in export credit fol Zambia. It is even rumored that South Africa is paying direct to the Shah of Persia to cover Zambia's oil deficit!

But Vorster felt that it was only matter of time before other western powers were forced to Vorater intervene against the MPLA. What he ignored was the totally different balance of class forces on a world scale.

The forward movement of the working class, and not least in the USA itself made it impossible for US imperialism to risk anything resembling Vietnam and the US had to restrict itself to undercover arms supplies to the FNLA through Zaire.

Vorster was caught on a limb in Angola and has now been forced to pull back. This considerably weakens his ability to intervene on the side of Smith in the coming liberation war for Zimbabwe.

WEAKER

But Vorster is now in a much weaker position than he was a year ago. When he first started talking to Kaunda at the end of 1974, Angola was hardly mentioned. Vorster thought that if he could force Smith to a compromise then South Africa could get on with the business of cultivating • good relations with regimes like those in Zambia, Botswana and Malawi.

Mozambique, Vorster telt, did not provide much of a problem. The FRELIMO regime, he calculated, would have to come to an 'understanding' with South Africa because of its heavy dependence on the South African gold mines to solve Mozambique's unemployment problem through migrant labour.

Now things have changed. Vorster made the. disastrous mistake of getting involved in Angola. This was originally at the instigation of Kaunda who had thrown his support behind UNITA because of the latter's control of the Benguela railway, a vital Zambian route to the coast.

SLUMP

At a meeting of the Zambian state owned conglomerate 'Indeco' last October, government officials told managers that South African imports were definitely to be encouraged. With a world slump in from Nkomo's proposals. His current position would delay African majority rule in Zimbabwe for twenty years at least.

VORSTER

This is not simply because Vorster burnt his fingers militarily in Angola (though. some hawk! among the South African Genera Staff are arguing for a decisive battle with the Cuban/MPLA forcer on the Angola/Namibia border t boost the flagging morale of the South African Army). MON important, the situation is now tha Vorster has to make peace not jus with one left' regime -Mozambique; but now with two the new one being Angola. If hi does not come to a settlement witt the MPLA then of course he wil lose the battle in Namibia - thi clatter of dominoes can almost br heard - as Angola provides 1 natural base for the SWAPC guerrillas fighting for Namibiar independence from South Africa The MPLA is willing, it seems, tr come to a compromise with Vorste in return for South Africa recognition of the MPLA All this drives the wedg between Smith and Vorster deepe and deeper. It is inevitable that thi South African bourgeoisie become less and less preoccupied with thi "kith and kin' north of thi Limpopo river and more concerner with the vital investmen opportunities that lie in Angola one of the richest states in thi African continent.

While the MPLA Victor. destroys Smith's ability to look to South Africa for support, it at th same time weakens the position o Kaunda in Zambia and his stoog Nkomo.

Over the last_few weeks thi working class in Zambia has beer demonstrating and striking agains not only twenty five per cen inflation, and massivi unemployment in the coppe industry but also against FNLA UNITA and in support of th MPLA.

The success of the MPLA as : military victory has in the contex of Nkomo's antics in Salisbur (Rhodesia) vastly increased thi support of the Zambian massess fo the Zimbabwe guerilla struggle ans has forced Kaunda and his fellow petty bourgeois leaders in th Organisation for African Unity tr admit the inevitability of thi coming war for the liberation i

----- pull-quotes -----

THE WORKERS SOCIALIST