The Easy Coup the Real Lessons of the 1973 Coup

Scan page 6

CHILE Six years ago this week Salvador Allende, the candidate of the Popular Unity, was elected President of Chile with just over 36 per cent of the votes cast. Three years ago this week Allende was shot dead in his Presidential Palace.

An hour or two before his death he made his final broadcast. In it he called on Chilean workers to fight with arms against the military coup which was taking place. Tens of thousands of workers had already begun to do so. They barricaded themselves in their factories or their homes and used what little armanent they had to resist with formidable courage the ruthless attacks of the armed They were defeated. In the struggle of that day and the months which followed, 20,000 workers and their allies were murdered by the military dictatorship. Tens of thousands more were put in jail where most of them remain today. Workers' organisations - political parties and trade unions, factory, neighbourhood and women's committees -were systematically exterminated by the dictatorship.

REPRESSION

In the three years since 1973 the repression azs continued undiminished. All the material pains made by the working class in decades of struggle have been wiped out and reversed. The standard of living of workers has been cut to less than half of its 1973 level. Virtually all the industries nationalised during the Popular Unity foremment have been returned to the apitaliss The total, production of the -- 2-- =-TI. . PART SL TCLIFFE.

unemployment has risen, even on the latest estimate of the dictatorship, to more than 20 percent of the labour force.

In this way the Chilean working class has defeat of suffered a milhistóricolitical and economic consequences of the defeat are to be seen not only in Chile but also in other Latin American countries where the success of the Chilean military junta has (temporarily at least) strengthened the forces of reaction.

On a world scale, however, Chile is still an exception; the working class remains undefeated. The defeat of Chile, therefore, can be reversed as part of the present worldwide advance of the working class. But unless the lessons of that defeat are thoroughly, learned it will be a horrific demonstration of what lays in store for the workers of the whole world.

The analysis of those lessons is a task which can only be successfully undertaken by the Trotskyist movement. This is because, under the guise of bringing out the 'lessons of Chile , the leaders of the reformist and Stalinist parties - those parties which led the Popular Unity in Chile - have been doing the opposite. Ever since 1970, and even more so since the coup of 1973, they have conducted a single-minded campaign to prevent the real lessons from being leamed.

This campaign has been taken by those parties into the various campaigns of "solidarity" with the Chilean working class such as the Chilean Solidarity Campaign in Britain. And it is being conducted by the parties of the Chilean resistance. All too often, organisations which claim to be Irotskyist, far from unmasking this treacherous campaign, have actually helped to nitro it madama Thin in her dha Bledne Socialist League considers it to be a matter the utmost importance to fight for : understanding of the lessons of Chile and the building of a real and ac tive solidar with the Chilean working class.

WHAT WAS POPULAR UNITY?

The Chilean Popular Unity was an explicitly class-collaborationist electoral and then government alliance of workers' and bourgeois parties. As such, it was founded in 1969 to fight the 1970 presidential elections but it grew out of similar looser alliances which had put up Salvador Allende, a member of the right wing of the Socialist Party, in the presidential elections of 1952, 1958 and 1964.

After Allende's defeat by the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei in 1964, the Communist Party, in particular, began to propose a tightening of the alliance with what it claimed were the 'progressive' sections of the bourgeoisie. In particular, this meant the Radical Party. It was this party with which the Socialist and Communist Parties had been in a Popular Front government from 1938 to 1947, when the Radicals expelled the CP from the_government and declared the party illegai.

spite of this the Chilean CP has consitently tried to return to the Popular Front of the thirties and forties in which it had held some power.

In 1968 the Radical Party itself split, the majority declaring itself a 'left-wing' party. This was the final encouragement to the CP to link up with these Radicals in the Popular Unity. an Chilean Socialist Party is not a social democratic party on the lines of the French or Italian Socialist Parties or the British Labour Party. In fact, it was the Radical Party in Chile which was recognised by the so-called "Socialist International" of Callaghan, Schmidt, Soares and Mitterand.

The Socialist Party was formed after the 12-day "socialist republic" of 1933 by five parties which had supported that abortive government. These parties ranged from those which regarded themselves as social democratic to one which at the time actually claimed some sympathy with Trotskyism.

The varied origins of the Socialist Party were still to some extent reflected in its composition in the late 1960s. The right wing of the party was led by Allende (a tounder member) and unhesitatingly supported the setting up of the Popular Unity. The left wing, largely in the rank and file of the party, was from the beginning critical of the Popular Unity and the CP.

CANDIDATE

When the decision had to be taken as to who would be the Popular Unity presidential candidate, the Communist Party readily dropped its own original proposal of Pablo Neruda (the Stalinist poet who had supported Stalin's Moscow trials and purges and his campaign of lies and slanders against Trotsky in the 1930s) in favour of Allende.

It was in his own Socialist Party that Allende's candidacy was hotly debated and resisted by a large section of the left wing

Scan page 7

adhered to revolutionary Marxism.

A fourth participant in the Popular Unity was the MAPU (Movement of Unitary Popular Action), a petty-bourgeois group which had split from the Christian Democratic Party in disillusion with Frei's reforms'. During the period of Popular Unity government a split in the MAPU was engineered by the Communist Party: the majority were closely allied with sections of the Socialist Party on the left of the Popular Unity, while the minority were virtually indistinguishable from the Allende Socialists, the Radical Party and the Communist Party on its right.

DENIALS

The Popular Unity therefore was, despite the denials of most of its leaders, a Popular Front alliance. It differed from the Popular Fronts of the 1930s and 1940s in two respects. The bourgeois parties played a smaller direct role in the Popular Unity than they had done in the Chilean Popular Front of 1938-47 or in the post-war Popular Fronts in France and Italy. In addition, those earlier popular fronts had been justified by the Stalinist parties as a defensive alliance against fascism. The Popular Unity was instead justified as a way of reaching 'socialism' by peaceful and parliamentary means.

In that respect the Chilean Communist Party's policy in launching the Popular Unity coincides completely with the present policy of other Stalinist parties in Europe: the Italian CP's proposal for a "historic compromise" with the Christian Democrats; the Spanish Communist Party's willingness to enter a coalition "government of national unity" with Christian Democrats and even fascists; the French "Unity of the Left" with Mitterand's Socialist Party. Although each of these parties envisage a slightly different kind of governmental alliance, they all have in common a readiness to compromise as far as is necessary for a chance to participate in the There is no question that if the Communist Party in Chile could have set up a broader alliance, including the Christian Democrats, it would have done so. In fact, as the Popular Unity government of Allende encountered increasing hostility from the right wing, the CP urged more and more that it should invite the Christian Democrats to join it.

GYRATIONS

However, the "Trotskyists" of the "United Secretariat of the Fourth International" have, after a number of gyrations, reached the erroneous conclusion that the Popular Unity was not really a popular front at all but a United Front of workers' parties. Thus, Tariq Ali in an IMG pamphlet says that:

"The Popular Unity in Chile was thus, if anything (sic) a reformist • united front dominated by two large working class parties". • (Chile, Lessons of the Coup, p3).

A correct assessment of the class character of a government is basic to establishing a correct political line towards it. And an assessment cannot be made by these empiricist methods, as Trotsky showed vividly Allende with Cuban leader, Castro.

in the case of the Popular Front in Spain:

"the bourgeoisie's place was occupied by its shadow. Through the medium of the Stalinists, Socialists and Anarchists, the Spanish bourgeoisie subordinated the proletariat to itself without even bothering to participate in the Popular Front" '. ( Trotsky The Spanish Revolution, Pathfinder Press, P 309)

The Italian USFI leader, Livio Maitan, compounds the error when he says:

"The Chilean Popular Unity was not a re-edition of the old Popular Fronts... after a- certain point, as the dynamic of the class struggle sharpened, the Popular Unity based itself ever more exclusively on the working class parties and came up against the opposition of the entire bourgeoisie". International, Summer 1974, p7).

This is an astounding judgement when placed beside the fact that, for a large proportion of the last 18 months of the popular Unity government, senior army officers occupied key posts in the cabinet -the 'shadow' of the bourgeoisie was replaced by its most solid substance.

POLICIES OF THE POPULAR FRONT GOVERNMENT The programme of the Popular Unity followed from its popular frontist class collaborationist nature. Although, in an effort to head off opposition from the left; the leaders often talked about the Chilean road to "socialism", › the programme was expucitly not anti-capitalist but 'anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchy and anti-monopoly. All these aims were in principle saleable to the national capitalist class and to most sections of the petty bourgeoisie. The government explicitly promised in effect not to attack capitalist property relations.

The economy was to be divided into three sectors - the state sector, the mixed sector and the private sector. The plan was to nationalise the major monopoly sectors of the economy, especially the natural resource industries as copper, saltpetre and coal; to purchase state participation in others and to leave the vast majority of small capitalists untouched. The government gave solemn guarantees to this last group that they would not be taken over.

The absence of a parliamentary majority and its firm adherence to constitutionalism meant that the government had to rely on existing legislation. A number of acts passed under the 1933 "socialist republic" and under the Popular Front governments, which had never been revoked, permitted nationalisations in certain' circumstances.

Other nationalisations, such as that of the major banks, were effected by government purchase of shares on the stock market. The Popular Unity's land reform also was carried out entirely under the land reform legislation of the previous Christian Democratic Many claims have been made by its sympathisers for the scale and importance of the reforms carried out in difficult circumstances by the Popular Unity. How great were they in reality?

3N In the sphere of expanding the state sector of the economy a major change certainly took place. When the Popular Unity took office the state-owned sector of industry comprised 31 enterprises producing about 12 percent of total industrial output. By 1973 the state sector included about 300 enterprises which accounted for about 30 percent of national output but well under 20 percent of employment.

But was this socialist nationalisation? The answer is self-evident. Except in practice in the case of the copper mines, full compensation was paid; thus in no sense was capital expropriated. Though various forms of "participation" of workers were introduced in the state sector they were the very opposite of workers' control.

There were, however, an increasing number of nationalisations which were not initiated by the government at all. They were initiated by the workers themselves, who ran far ahead of the government in their demands for real socialist nationalisations under workers' control.

When workers took over the factories of capitalists, the government stepped in and legalised the takeovers in an effort to prevent their assuming a socialist character.

In • the firms of the state sector the conditions of workers were normally improved: hours were reduced, sports, health and childcare facilities were often provided. And usually these too went far beyond what the Popular Unity leaders would have willingly introduced.

The ability of the workers in the state-owned sector to make such gains was an encouragement to workers all over the country to initiate other nationalisations. This was, however, completely in conflict with the Popular Unity's policy of guaranteeing the integrity of the vast majority of capitalist firms.

As a result, more energy was spent by the Popular Unity leaders in preventing nationalisations than in encouraging them. The 80 percent of workers who in 1973 still worked for private capitalists received a practical demonstration of the conflict between the Popular Unity programme and the improvement of their own working conditions.

AGRICULTURE

The same situation arose in the agricultural sector. Once again proponents of the Popular Unity point proudly to the fact that in its three years the government brought more land into the "reformed" " largely cooperativer Christian Democratic government had done in six years. What this claim conveniently evades is the fact that 82 percent of Chilean peasants and rural workers remained wholly untouched by the land reform.

Many of the takeovers which did take place were at the initiative of peasants themselves, who confiscated vast areas in the famous 'tomas' or unauthorised takeovers of land. These, like the factory takeovers, were bitterly opposed by the Popular Unity leadership, especially by the Communist Party, as being the work. of "ultra-left provocateurs"

As in the industrial sector the graduali: and anti-socialist conception of reforms' hel by the Popular Unity increased the divisior among the working class, leaving the va: majority untouched.

Most workers, however, gained som benefit from some of the other social reforn of the Popular Unity, such as the expansion ‹ the health service and the distribution of mil to poor urban families. In addition, tr expansionist, Keynesian economic policies ‹ the government in its first years very rapid] produced an economic boom, sharpl reducing unemployment and leading to a average increase in real wages of almost 30 in its first year of office. These temporar improvements were real and quite rapid.

There was nothing socialist about ther since they relied on encouraging a rap: expansion of the capitalist economy. And,: the absence of any socialist measures, the inevitably contained the seeds of their ou collapse. After the first years of office suc reforms were increasingly eroded as pressure on economic resources led difficulties in guaranteeing the distribution ‹ food, and inflation began to threaten re wages.

Ot course, it must be recognised that mar of the reforms which the Popular Unity tre to, or was forced to, introduce during its fir year in office were later threatened not onl by their own economic contradictions bi also by acts of sabotage by the Chilea bourgeoisie and the imperialists.

So, for instance, Chilean copper sales wel interrupted by the attempts by th exproprated copper companies to prever copper shipments being paid for by th purchasers.

International credit was virtually cut ol from all capitalist sources, though the Popula Unity never repudiated the debts incurred b the Frei government, even though it forced rescheduling of payments on a number c occasions. Internally the sabotage particulart took the form of two long lockouts by roa haulage firms in 1972 and then just before th coup in 1973.

Such attempts at sabotage have bee presented by the apologosts of the Popula Unity as a major cause of its defeat which wa beyond its control. The uncomfortable fact however, is that the government's reaction t sabotage and bourgeois opposition of th Popular Unity was not resistance bu compromise. Almost invariably it retreater before right wing opposition and tried ti demobilise the workers and peasants whi were pressing through their actions for a mor uncompromising and socialist response.

Once again, the Popular Unity's attitude sprang from its overall conception that the pace of events should be controlled by what the potentially "progressive' sector of the bourgeoisie would accept and not by what the working class required and demanded Compromise and retreat was not a tactical "mistake"; it was built into the class collaborationist politics of the Popular Unity CONCLUDED NEXT EDITION.

Scan page 8

SOCIALIST PRESS, FiTr TITT 'ednesday 8th Sep mbei

----- pull-quotes -----

The Socialist Party was, therefore, an reformists and centrists who; in words