[PART TWO OF OUR ARTICLE ON THE JUNE…]

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PART TWO OF OUR ARTICLE ON THE JUNE 15 ELECTIONS BY A SPECIAL CO The Socialist Party (PSOE)

and the Communist Party participated in the June 15 elections, along with Suarez, in the hope that they would be enough to head off revolutionary crisis.

And they did so secure in the knowledge that the elections could not produce a majority for the workers' parties which might oblige them to form a government.

The predictable results of the election were from the beginning, therefore, a basis for the continuation of Suarez' Francoist government and a preparation for a possible future popular front coalition in which the socialists, and perhaps eventually the CP, would participate.

The PSOE and CP campaigns reflected their involvement in this plan. It was the CP in particular which used its campaign to demonstrate its exceptional devotion to the political rules which the Francoists had established.

MONARCHIST

The monarchist flag flew over their meetings, from which intruders with anarchist, republican, Maoist or Trotskyist banners or literature were excluded, if necessary by force.

Carrillo diverted his attack solely against Fraga and the Popular Alliance, having declared long before the elections that he wished Suarez, who he said represented the "civilised right" , to continue as Prime Minister.

An example of the extent to which the CP leaders are prepared to go in making clear that it was no threat to the bourgeoisie occurred in Valdemoro.

A CP member defending himself against physical attack while selling papers on the street, accidentally killed a Popular Alliance thug.

The CP reacted by expelling their member, forbidding CP lawyers to defend him against a murder charge and sending a delegation to the funeral of the Popular Alliance thug!

"VICTORY"

Do welcomed the result:

Ty over fascism anü pr * Spanish were RRESPONDENT IN not yet ready for having the CP in the government and so proposed immediately a Suarez-PSOE coalition.

The PSOE itself is also preparing the ground for its own collaborationist government with Suarezbut not yet.

Party leader wishes to remain for a time to consolidate his position.

COALITION

He is already preparing the way to join a coalition with Suarez after the proposed municipal elections later this year or early next.

The bourgeoisie has been assured then that Gonzalez and Carrillo are ready to play their direct role in the government when they are needed.

Meanwhile the main role of the reformist and Stalinist leaders will be to extend their electoral truce with the capitalist class into a long term strategy of demobilisation of the Spanish working class on the immedtately explosive questions of democratic rights (complete amnesty, trade union rights, national self-determination in Fastadi and Catalonia) and econnic conditions wages and unentI. chese conditions the position * the PSOl and CP leaders is tar rom socure cien with their oun "embers PSOE leader Gonzalez in the elections to their left did not gain more than a handful of votes was because they were not seen as clear alternatives to the PSOE and CP.

Three parties, the Revolutionary Workers Organisation (ORT), the Communist Movement (MC) and the Labour Party (PT)-all of them containing various combinations of Maoism, centrism and petty bourgeois and Christian radicalism, and all of them still illegal-put up candidates in all the large provinces.

Their overall failure was well deserved since their militant tone failed to conceal that beneath the surface these parties were presenting only a left-sounding populist, version of the CP position.

One candidacy of the left claimed to be qualitatively different the FUT (Front for Workers' Unity). This Front was supported by the LCR (Revolutionary Communist League, sympathising section of the _USFI); the OIC (Organisation of the Communist Left, a centrist group with right wing positions on the national question and an ultra-left opposition to 18:90 the building oi trade unionsi: and fution ta small contrist group!.

The FLT did argue in its mectings. and to a limited extent in its campaign literature. for the dissolution of the Francoist repressive apparatus, for malional self deter mination and agains: the monarchy It argued against the social pail. denounced the non democrain nature of the clections. condemned the votes*at: ...

slogan was "We too need our worker in the congress"

The LCR hovered uncertainly between these two positions and the question of what their objective was in the campaign remained extremely confused.

FUT representatives appeared at some of the "round tables" (organised by the press and other organisations) along with representatives of the other candidacies, including Suarez Democratic Centre and Fraga's Popular Alliance.

In Madrid at the end of May the LCR withdrew its support from a demonstration prompted by the savage repression of the amnesty week in Esukadi-on the grounds that it might be converted into a demonstration for a boycott of the elections (since the other groups calling for it favoured the boycott).

And on the last night of the campaign the FUT refused to give to representatives of organisations calling for the boycott rights to speak in a rally in Madrid.

INDEFENSIBLE

All these indefensible concessions to electoralism, though not the inevitable results of participation itself, followed from the confused and contradictory nature of the FUT campaign.

The LCR and other groups on the left argued that to call for a boycott was to invite political isolation.

In fact one of the effects of the FUT campaign was to help to convert this into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Viewed in the context of the events of the year since the Suarez government took office, however, the tactic of the boycott appears as a viable alternative to the headlong rush of the left parties to present their candidates in the elections.

A sustained and consistent cam • 48. 1 paign Ic: "reform *7252003g native. 3 *iationary constittent assembly. cou: have impact.

political dire-tor :o ide enermous and threatening as chilisations which the 0:0r:50 110 SiR: have been ric 10 Piert .... Munirowing Farole.

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tical problems.

Meetings were forbidden 1q police and organisers and Pos stickers were arrested.

Nonetheless, in some cities a factories public, if semi-cland tine, meetings took place, post appeared and propaganda distributed.

BOYCOTT

Some anarchists and Mac sects called for a boycott on :

basis of opposing 'parliament:

cretinism' and some left nati alists in Euskadi defended it on 1 basis of petty-bourgeois rom:

ticism about the possibilities 'real' bourgeois democracy.

But the main boycott campai was that organised by the Co munist League (another sympal ising section of the USFI, thou its present policy is disowned its previous allies in the Americ SWP) and by the OCI (Organisatir of the Fourth International, alliance with the OCI in Franci Despite some tendency to ovi emphasise the absence of dem cratic rights as if these were a co dition for participation, this car paign rightly called on all worki class organisations to boycott ti elections as the clearest and mo effective tactic against the plans : the Spanish bourgeoisie and th collaboration of the reformist an Stalinist leaders.

Suarez (left) with Franco i car? and Fraga (right).

And now after the elections :* political issues. . taken up in := boycott campaign remain central: the way ahead for the Spars. working class.

This is because thoug" elections have enable: Francoists (now with the ::m= backing of PSOE and CP lessa: : hang on to governmenta: =.*=they have not er.:. = 1 :.: Francoists to rule To rule at i ne means to impose :ass d captans:

Francolsts are own "leaders The Postpone 1. But i= removed the 9ec055ar Spain termean an i the Fiances s