Workers Socialist League

Socialist Press, Trotskyism Today and the Trotskyist International Liaison Committee, 1975–1984

[In order to safeguard its own ›ower, King…]

Socialist Press no. 66, 3 August 1977 · scan pp. 7–8 · about 2,369 words

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In order to safeguard its own ›ower, King Alfonso XIII slipped juletly out of Spain, and the Republic was declared.

Two months later, elections to he new Cortes gave a massive najority to the parties in support of the Republic.

The Socialist Party • alone had wice as many seats as all the nonarchist and clerical parties ogether, and was the largest group n the parliament.

Alcala Zamora, a right wing Catholic Republican, became Prime Minister of the coalition which was formed-a wide-ranging P opular FORESHADOW With minor changes, this governnent lasted from June 1931 to Vovember 1933; in many aspects t foreshadows the later Popular Front which was to betray the vorking class during the Civil War.

It was urgently necessary to esolve the bourgeois democratic asks of the Republic. There was no ¡reat difficulty in recognising the nain tasks that needed to be fulilled: a solution to the agrarian problem; the development of the iroductive forces in industry; ontrol over the church and the But each of these lasks could be erformed only by crushing the vorking class, or by the working lass itselt seizing power.

The 'failure' to institute these eforms was in no way accidental. 'he bourgeois and petty bourgeois lepublicans could not manage a emocratic revolution: they were orced to attack the workers and eject their democratic demands, ust as they were forced to rely ncreasingly on the bulwarks of MP00349 reaction.

The loyal support given to the government by the Socialist Party did nothing to alter its bourgeois character.

HOLD

On the contrary, it merely allowed the capitalist parties to maintain a hold on the large sections of the working class which were organised in the UGT, while never conceding any of the reformist demands put forward by Largo Caballero and other Socialist leaders.

It was the mass actions of the working class which had largely created the republic of workers of all classes' (this description was drafted into the constitution at the prompting of the Socialists), but power had been transferred immed¡ately to the bourgeoisie.

Only the Left Opposition had been able to analyse correctly the nature of the Spanish revolution and its members were isolated within the still insignificant Stalinist Communist Party.

The Stalinist line itself was the ultra-left Third Period policy imposed on the Comintern by Stalin.

UNABLE Despite its militant left-wing, the Socialist Party had no strong Marxist tradition.

it proved wholly unable to develop an understanding of the theory of permanent revolution, or to recognise that only by mobilising workers and peasants in the struggle to impose the dictatorship of the proletariat could democratic reforms be won in the process of building socialism.

Meanwhile the Anarchists, remaining blind to the true nature of the state, refused to see that their policies were based in idealism and would inevitably result in the defeat of the working class by the armed might of the bourgeois state.

DOWNFALL The refusal of the Socialists to challenge the policies of the 'democratic bourgeois government, and the abstentionist strategy of the Anarchists, bought about the downfall the Republican coalition.

The continuing failure of the government lo counter the effects of the intensifying world iconomic crisis led to a widespread loss • surenThe doc: unsel November 103 #000 0231-*2 Gil Robles, leader of CEDA Government was now in the hands of Lerroux, leader of the 'Radicals' (a right-wing party), and the Spanish workers and peasants suffered more open repression and mounting attacks during the 'bienio negro' , the "black two years'.

The new cabinet moved swiftly to repeal the minor reforms that had been granted, and concentrated most of its attention on crushing any independent action of the working class.

FASCIST

The largest party in this parliament was the Confederacion Espanola de Derechas Autonomas (CEDA), a fascist organisation which had grown rapidly towards the end of Azana's government. drawing its support trom the urtan petty bourgeoisie and lumpenproletariat, and from sections of the peasantry who had gained from the Socialists and Republicans only increased poverty.

1934 was the year of the first major confrontation between fascists and the workers. Gil Robies, CEDA leader, had called three mass rallies to display CEDA's strength. but in each area the fascists were met by general strikes. the complete disruption of transport, and blockades of workers sho drove back the fascist The backward nature of the Spanish economy and the plunge of international capitalism into ever deepening crisis made these problems more acute daily, and exposed the tensions and contradictions within Spanish society.

The survival of the Republic depended on its ability to overcome these abstacles, but, by its very nature, the government could not possess this ability.

Caught on the one hand within the limits imposed on the 'progressive bourgeoisie by the international development of imperialism, and on the other hand by the balance of class forces within Spain itself, the Republicans vcre powerless to institute a democratic revolution.

Weak and uncompetitive, Spanish capitalism required protective tariffs in order to develop industrial production. But such a move would have provoked retaliation from other countries by the imposition of tariffs on Spanish agricultural produce.

Torn between its loyalties to the industrial capitalists and to the major landowners, the Republican coalition was powerless to act: both industry and agriculture continued to stagnate.

AGRARIAN

This negative policy intensified in its turn the agrarian problem. 70% of the population worked on the land, and three-quarters of these were landless labourers.

On the vast estates of the south, employment was at best only seasonal and increasingly unobtainable even at wages well below starvation level; in the north the smallholdings were too small to provide subsistence for those working them.

An immediate retorm of the division of land was imperative: only nationalisation and redistribution among ihe peasants could in any way alleviate the constant overt:and starvation they 22m 0 cars:: and inetficient agnicultural methods which prevailed throughout Spain.

CHURCH & ARMY

At every turn the Repuhlie was lo encounter the powerful hostility of both Church and Army. At the same time. the dominant bourgeois dements ithin the government we: C0t ?! repared to restrict torer y ÷ rightiy 01.1 been COUP Drawn mostly from the old aristocracy, the officer caste was strongly conscious of its many links with the major capitalists and landowners. It represented a continuous threat to democracy and in August 1932 a military coup was launched by General Sanjurjo. with the support of these and other reactionary forces.

The coup failed, but still the government made no move: the capitalist parties had already seen in practice the support they could receive from the army against the working class in the local general strikes organised by the CNT the previous summer.

Azana had then revealed the true character of the "progressive bourgeoisie' by ordering the army to crush the strike in Seville. Manuel Azana These confrontations led the reactionary government to attempt to bring three fascists into the cabinet. The workers replied swiftly: the UGT called a general strike within three hours, and once again the army was brought in.

The solidity of the strike reached its highest point. in Asturias where the miners set up a Workers' and Peasants' Republic.

Land was given to the peasants, the factories were seized and. armed with dynamite, the workers resisted for fifteen days the troops sent against them under the command of General Franco.

3,000 workers were kil:dmostly in reprisals after surrender-but in the struggle :: Asturias the Spanish workers i=: learned new methods s: arr =. -23:023 ...:-= Workers' Alliances hai -÷=formed to urite the differer: :::isations of the class lance, and the ....... Asturias had been through the mind : ::. in Spain.

The smashing strike was followe struggles againsi government with cas release of ali striners ar Continued next edition By Dare Whi tfield

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Aircraft grounded by the action of Heathrow engineers.

lage IAN SWINDALE Socialist Workers engineers shift pa But an examination of any ot their interventions in the struggles of the working class clearly demonstrates the political basis for this recruitment-political adaptation to the militant struggles of workers.

With the working class having decisively rejected the plans of the TUC bureaucracy to foist another round of wage controls on them under the guise of an "orderly return to free collective bargaining"

British airways loks at the arty in the dispute.

As the largest political organisation to the left of the Communist Party the Socialist Workers Party claims' to be growing rapidly both in size and influence in the workers' movement.

BP recor Jof Heatl Irow for an understanding of the full implications of the dispute, within the leadership of the strike.

The stewards based their shift pay claim on the fact that British Airways paid the worst shift pay rates in the West London area.

The strike bulletin pointed out that for example, for the Monday to Friday double day shift, British Airways paid £4.15. The lowest figure for a similar shift outside the airport was found to be £9.20 and the highest, £17.00.

Since Schedule ll of the Employment Protection Act allows for wages to be brought up to levels predominant in a surrounding area, the stewards argued that the Social Contract was not the issue and that the rise could be granted under existing legislation.

The engineers were very wary of the Stalinists who dominated the wages sub-committce, the lowest level of the negotiating machinery, and who were blocking the shift pay claim from being advanced jointly by all unions in the maintenance section of British Airways.

Of the five negotiators for the strikers one, Frank Gates, stood out as a 'left' In private he also was prepared to admit that the Social Contract was at the centre of the dispute, but in public he was prepared to go along with the line that Schedule Il of the Employment Protection Act covered the claim.

The job confronting revolutionaries in this situation was clear. The dispute could only be won if the maintenance workers were of other workers on the airport in a struggle to destroy the Social Contract and the Lib-Lab coalition government and open the way up to pay claims to defend living standards for all workers.

DEVELOP

In strike situations workers given a lead are in a position to develop their political understanding more in a few weeks than might have been possible over a period of years previously.

Ideas are tested out in practice and so are leaders. In such a situation it is the task of revolutionaries not only to fight for the policies necessary to win the particular struggle but to raise in a conscious way the broader questions raised by the struggle.

Nowhere was this more important than in the strikes that broke out during Phase 2, all of which placed in jeopardy the future of the government.

But the SWP failed to raise these issues either amongst the stewards or the mass membership.

One brief leaflet advertising an SWP meeting referred to the conflict as being against the Social Contract, but what was necessary was to constantly raise these broader issues before the membership so that workers could be steeled for the scale of the confrontation and political development could take place.

INTERVENTION

From such an intervention it would be possible for the best elements in the strike to be brought towards revolutionary Marxism.

For the SWP, however, "intervention" in the struggles of the working class is seen in terms of offering to print the strike bulletin, printing support stickers and collection sheets and other such "practical help"

But collection sheets are no substitute for the fight for political clarity amongst workers coming into conflict with forces which they only inadequately understand.

Why were the AUEW Executive Committee refusing to make the strike official? Why was the wages subcommittee, dominated by Communist Party members, blocking the claim? Why was the self-styled "revolutionary' , Reg Birch, demanding they return to work and blaming the working class itself for the Social Contract? PRESS, Wednesday August, joined the rest voted for a although they that there was the workers penny.

The SWP position by money could RESTAURANT mittee were behaving in this way solely because as individuals they were "bureaucrats' Without a fight to focus it on the central issues involved the strike had eventually to collapse.

As this became clear, the SWP, instead of offering any lead for those prepared to fight on. simolv of the stewards and return to work, knew at that point, still no guarantee of receiving a single rationalised their claiming that the not have been won anyway and tnat at least the union was now more firmly established in the airport than at any previous time.

The engineers returned to work on the basis of an agreement by British Airways to negotiate the shift pay claim within several weeks. Discussions on new shift patterns were not to be a precondition for a settlement.

Once the strikers went back, nowever, Bntish Airways insisted that they would only negotiate the shift pay claim if the union would at the same time negotiate new shift patterns which would result in more work being done by the day shift at the expense of the other shifts.

Further industrial action was proposed by the AUFW alone if the joint claim was not agreed by British Airways.

The form of this action was proposed by one of the SWP stewards, and embodies a characteristic evasion of all-out struggle. There should, he suggested, be a strike by each shift once a week until the management came up with the money.

Although accepted by a mass meeting of engineers, this action collapsed after the second week.

PROPOSED Subsequently the SWP stewards proposed immediate strike action if the claim was not paid by August 1. The Joint Stewards Committee agreed to this proposal and British Airways, faced with this threatened strike action, agreed to pay up without prior negotiations on new shift patterns. But they insisted that the claim would have to be cleared by the Department of Trade.

The of the SWP to raise 1C4HLT8M

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PHOTO: Andrew Wiard, (Report). air BP

← Contents of Socialist Press no. 66, 3 August 1977