What Are the Lessons of Cuba?

YISM

GE

WHAT ARE THE

LESSONS OF CUBA?

he overthrow of Batısta's dictatorship in 1959, Castro's vast expropriations of capitalist property in 1960 and the successful repulse of the United States sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 were a drastic challenge to the theory and practice of all movements claiming to adhere to revolutionary Marxism.

The most fundamental questions were raised: what was the nature of the Cuban state and its rulers? What did the Cuban experience show aharasha valia party? Was unique or previous his Could it be theory, stra put to the questions In the about the role of the revolutionary Cuban experience it comparable to al events elsewhere' ated? Revolutionary and tactics were all in answering those was ing to be ml ajor organisations . Trotskyist. st. the tOOK On specIal ine im- CuDan Agreement that Cuba was a state became one of the axes of the pact in which in majority of the American Workers Party and the International Secretariat into the "United" Secretari Fourth International after of organisational division.

On the other hand a de Cuba was any form of work was one of the points used workers' principal 1963 the Socialist Pabloite | reunified at of the 10 years nial ers by that state jerry

BY BOB SUTCLIFFE AND ADAM WESTOBY

tealy and the eague leadership lase from which eunification. Within this discussion League leadership as a programmatic lal pr Labour to oppose the ube some important theoretical contribu- ions were made by the SWP n ity; but the leaders of the leading organisations of the skyist movement, the USFI an International Committee sacrifi deeper theoretical discussior tactical advantage. As a result the USFI and the IC have rem committed to positions on which were er oneous at the Trot- Pi to and which have in the succeeding 15 increasinely exposed Vean

WICEE SEVE

s become by further development Both parties have consist to revive a discussion stifled in its infancy This article is a cont the necessary revival of sion. It is part of a longer ublished shortly in the standinion to s in Cuba. ently failed which was ribution to this discus- study to be form of an L.d.. 4n00 introduction to Tim Wolforth's 1963 essay on the Theory of Structural Assimilation In this introduction the wil be analysed between the C case and that of Eastern Eu and China. In all these cases the exprop riation of the cap talist class and the foundations of a planned economy were laid ithout the intervention of links uban Europe and stoletar (ist) part concerte the USE Although produced answers, error cor embrace t is ei 04 = of the USFI and the IC. evI is 1 the t nd thi in the appar e was n to l oden there revolutionary (Trot ich has leaders heo : IC. case entl am 30th on was i Cuba they opposite lological ng them d solu setariar maki e-side 10 pr Castro

GE revolutionary leader there could be no (Healy) or there was a therefore there must (unconscious) proletari ary leadership (USFI). Cuba, however, was an excep tional example, but an example nonetheless, of the contradictory process by which workers' states haud haan erostart in the narind cinna therefore vorkers' state workers' state bave been an an revolution the Second Worid War. If we wished to express paradox of the last three decades nutshell, it would be this: that Stalinist cancer which infected proletarian social revolution has been destroyed by the extension te revoluton, out, on tr has extended with it. Not but Stalinism has made senanicine instrumant af …Con only itsel aBY. hat. the organising instrument of destroying capitalism and forming the post-war states, in Eastern Europe, China, Korea, Cuba, and just as it has made itself t deliberate organiser ....in ..... e post-war n Europe, Indochina, he equally of class anu the states reserved to imperialism.

Cuba, like the Eastern European buffer states, became structurally assimilated to the dege erated Soviet workers' states. In ti Cuban case the form of this assimi tien involved the integration o the island's economu with that the USSR the inn in politi al integration petty-bourgeois political movement with the Cuban Communist Party into a sinale bureaucratised Castro's ovement st Party Stalinist party and the assi international polic revolutionary wor Soviet Union. The Cut 1959- wa 18 • 3 party and the assimilation of Cuba's revolutionary world strategy of the ation ( ito the strateg if Cul y of sa's ter- the 63 an s one Revolut which ion was Cuba lainia Cuban CP (which called itself the called itself the r socialist Par ney ook t is he d came. power, importa ifferent very soon arter vastro to play an essential role.

nt to distinguish clearly stages in the part played the organised our movement it which they held dominant position.

In 1953 the denounced Castro's attack on the oncada barracks as putschist and ultra-leftist. This, though formally correct, was done for entirely opportunistic reasons. In April 1958, by refusing to back a general strike which was called by Castro's 26th July Movement, they guaranteed its failure. At this time, however, a section of the CP began through Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, la leading CP intellectual and a minister in Batista's wartime government) to have contacts with Castro's guerillas.

Less than a year later (1 January 1959) Batista fled nd Castro's forces took Havana. The Rebel ement ar nisations Mo Drg lal 1y. ti the whic le 26th of July other smaller overthrew Batista were under a radical, nation alist petty bourgeois leadership. The bulk of the movement's support hac come from the urban petty bour geoisie and trom the peasantry.

though it also gained so me base in the trade unions. After the revolu- tion Castro's initial statements (reflecting the views of many of his closest supporters) were anti-Soviet and frequently anti-communist. He spoke of building a society which was 'neither capitalist nor commun- ist. In the 18 months after the seizure of power, he formed a coali- tion government with sections of the liberal bourgeoisie, though his policy of reforms rapidly frightened off the more right-wing elements.

Castro's initial reforms were aimed at dismantling Batista's state apparatus and expropriating the great landholders and certain sections of foreign capital, especially the American sugar monopolies. Initially.

the policy led to economic pressure from American imperialism. This intensified in step with the reforms,

TRO TSK YISM TODA

and the 1 ment. In the broke off its the bedrock The US also to armed groups. Th Kennedy highly op compiled Batista launched invasion the mass people. A to declare the revolut Over the previous year the Soviet Jnion had moved swiftly into an uncasy political alliance with Castro.

This was cemented by the great economic influence which the Soviet Union acquired when, in 1960, it guaranteed (along with China) the sugar exports which had previously gone to the USA. In 1960 over three quarters of Cuba trade was still with the USA; in 196 over three-quarters of trade was witl the workers' states.

And the Soviet Jnion had begu 1 to arant large loans to Castro to ( sver iberals left the govern- summer of 1960 the US agreement to buy sugar, of the Cuban economy. gave material assistance counter-revolutionary Then, in April 1961, evidently act gon timistic intelligence ports, by the CIA largel from supporters in Flo the disastrous Bay which was total mobilisation o few days late the 'socialist' ion. in re rida- of Pigs' ly routed by f the Cuban r Castro was character of the trade deficit. Duri followir urther nationalisation of U erty in Cuba, Kennedy imp economic blockade theret ening Cuban economic reli the Soviet Union. In this s ig the S prop osed an y deep. ince or ituat on Cuba's polit ment came, ical and soci to be domini evel 188: probiems or culminating crisis of subsequent Kennedy pr no further soviet percy as in the Cuban Ictober 1962 'settlement' omised there attempt to wnoie: ( 'missile the eby be the id whi woul nvadı island (though this did nothing to inhibit attempts at internal subver- sion, including a series of Pothe miles of October plots to assassinate Castro).

1962 al at cons in chica ha noti nal exO ling to subver- tic CIA Moscow leadership and ship with imperialism. still battling to secure the Party apparatus, m the selective launched at the Congress (Oct attempts to I its relation- Kruschev was his control in ainly through estalinisation' second CPSU 1961). His agricultural twenty ober boos production were unsuccesslul, Berlin crises and pressure from the military hierarchy for increased spending in Europe, to ether with the crash programme of missile construction imposed a rising burden resources. Kruschev's promises to increase consumption could not be met at the expense of heavy industr/, and when tin June 1962 hikes in food prices were announced there was at least one by Stalinism of the my both in "histories. = 18 Stalinist Cuba, pa lich now list and rtly because surround it revisionist During ine o CP was involved front' alliance supported him 1940 and 1944 cond work var tne in an open 'popular with Bastista: they in the elections of and had two minis: ters tone or wom was carlos Matael Rodriguez) in his Cabinet. After the war they shifted their allegiance to another section of the bourgeoisie, Grau's Authentico party, until Grau drove them into illegality. After Batista's re-seizure of power in 1952 they. remained in an ambiguous symbiotic relationship with his dictatorship. In exchange for a kind of semi-legal ty they held in check

TROTSK YISM

GE serious riot. On top of this Krusche's public claims that the USSR had equalled or passed the US in nuclear striking power were false (and were strongly suspected of being so at the top levels on either side). Previous a tempts at 'detente' notwithstanding. Kruschev was therefore under strong pressure to find a cheap way of compensating for the US advantage in inter-contin ental ballistic missiles ( the rising of US bases in around the Soviet Union at least, than the enormo comparable body of ICBI Soviet soil. Hence Kruschev's iate range much less CBMs) and allied states cheaper cost of a based on us vis the secret di initiativel of balistic missile costly than tch (or Itermed IRBMs) ICBMs) t 1962. Wher would hav atior east Cuba fully threa adain in the install tened st most summer of ed they effective maior citie spa retali n the southern and central USA.

But, before they were si cady for use, Kennedy, acti ntelligence reports, issued )ctober 22nd ultimatum, impo naval blockade of Cuba, and br to immediate readiness plar bomb the mis sites and to bomb the missile sites and for a after six days of secret negotiation, was forced to withdraw the missiles, but with the major quid pro quo of the missiles had its origin in Soviet scnev after was but an x days cret lation ced to traw issiles, h the quit pro quo of merica Kis of Cuba. the lar ) secret install siles had origin Soviet policies, and not in the nce simply of Cuba was high- ed by - firstly - the fact that proposal came from Kruschev, Castro, and - secondly - that native more cautious methods of ego ti he m protoung bura Rigantise Minerican invasion were not mooted. It would have been quite possible, for example, in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs and with increasing reliance by Kruschev on the deterrent effect of a major nuclear retaliatory strike, to have simply 'integrated' Cuba into the Warsaw pact alliances, declaring that any invasion would be treated in the same fashion as, say, an invasion of NATO forces into East Germany.

DUL HO SUCH Costess i were taken. Relations Cuban leadership and were severely strained chev's retreat in the 'mi reflecting Castro's rect the fate of Cuba was mined in the wake between the two super tomcar steps between the the Kremlin after Krus- ssile crisis' - ignition that being deter- of relations powers. The crisIs was between Washington was brought rudely that there could be 'national independe or otherwise nancied airect and Moscow. It home to Havana no such thing as ice' - socialist' country one 5880952 588= between Castro's political forces and Th ansf ereafter, ormattor however 1 of Cuba relative es Soviet a ler condi he Cuban litional de the soci continued :ternal seci d was n tions wh economy pendence conditior ity, tho provided would escape sugar. In of the growing, ( between. is of ugh und ow 1 trat rallel wi liance w but stro's n the th the sas itical

TENE

dopment R went a intimacy rees and ers had leve in ion ind Ca taken many posts at lower levels in from 1960 the Party began to move was not based merely on Castro's growing economic and political ties realised that they could not maintain ne Guban aken many he new ram 10k0 ur po

TATE

administration and an rel imi into with was growing with th realised any inde immense unless th the sam support closer stro's baset econt • US hat ti itiot not lot lear rain ven Cas tim. red ser ent fe popularity sved Ca CP towi time Castro required the of Castro, At organised political party at the time of the revolution. The organisation ganis Eth pol revol 26th Ous time itIon

IS SC

tent 5581 Mc no ti 15,4 love itter 2822-88 a sir teg 1 00 los irst a si beci Refor ission • wa tant itica volu Fidel organisation, the Integrated Revolu- 288: riguez became the first PSP member to be appointed to a senior govern- ment post when he became the head argan ionat Febru iguez .o be ment of thi itio isa 12 • tH ural 101

DESTEE

Cas tro 88E wa ÷ 01 irtu collapsed 1962 the chi months и ten ne Secretary of organisa- n, the stalinist Ani 1 Escalante, denounced by Castro for empting to seize power through icro-factional activities' and was exiled to the USSR. Although most CP leaders took their distance from Escalante, this event soured relations between Castro and the CP. A second step te irds a fusion was made in 1963, th the formation of the United wolutionarv Socialist Partu General Secretary of the organisa- att

(PURS

abort Ive. But the re this is proved ilt of these Virtual cal a bure: eff 19 Pat 15 equally efforts, end to ctivities ucracy. ict sus- 65 that ty was bu eau- to any Itsic sitica inder the put a polit state were ot u mun finally formed, entirely as a bureau- It Cuban se cratic i construction; hold a Congress for 10 years. - 30 = dence on the Soviet Union and from pul litic avar ISe. solit Despite the ies ¿astro's alinists, depen id fron lity te setweer ¡till no e 1960 senilla truggles sever Latin ands were 968 was to spring' was iss without three days viet and Dubcek) nted o1l Cuba's profound lence 1966 Chine. Mosco mechanica Cuban suf provoked Americar helt ns 1966 Castro's public splits The bonds eal as "Pragu uban t ven fo nasior fir press agency statements were printed Ionel lemo epor Omin after Czec Dress atr by th And Sovie wakian acy sta sk

IF I

i Sa pro- Wer

TAIL

6314 Prague, 1968 rugi

PAGE 8

side by side hen, session of the P Cent Castro made a speech bitterly critical of the Soviet assistance to Vietnam completely Soviet invasion. But already weeks before this, Castro had given scarcely any support to the French general strike, and certainly issued not a breath of criticism of the French CP's role in destroying it. And after 1968 Cuban support for Soviet international policies became more and more close until by the early 1970s it had became sychophantically uncritical, although on occasions performing as a kind of licenced left face of world stalinism. Virtually all support for guerilla movements was withdrawn Castro gave more or less uncritical support to 'revolutionary' military dictator- ships in Peru and then Panama. The Popular Front government of Allende received total support from Cuba and mild criticisms were reser- ved for after its destruction by the 1973 military coup. Through all this period a string of visits took place from CP leaders from Latin America.

after a ral Commi which, the inadequac Cuba (anı supported Eastern Europe Western Europe, elaborately feted. The Cuban revolution wa immediate stimulus to Wohli essay via the internal produced n the International mittee by_its disputes over too id even all of tally hem s the orth's crisis Com Cuba. However, ine neory or structural Assmilation does not embrace or discuss Cuba in any concrete way.

This was time brought the SLL that a taken pl become concede because Wolforth - at that aquiesced in the pressure by the Healy leadership of Healy argued that to grant social transformation had ace in Cuba, and that it had a workers' state, would be to that a political leadership omer inan a tokyist party tutu destroy capitalism and would there fore, be to capitulate politically (a.

the SWP majority leadership were doing) to Pabloism. Thus, argued the SLL leadership, Cuba had to be regarded as still a capitalist state, though of 'a special type. Wolforth, under pressure, finally accepted this position. In retrospect it is easy to see both the historically inaccurate character of the SLL's conclusion (more precisely, premise) and its purely formal, logical content, and also the basic flaw which it imparts to Wohlforth's essay. which is written so as to emphasise at all points the differences - even if they are not truly relevant - between developments in Cuba on the one hand, and in Eastern Europe and China on the other Yet in fact this b thesis of structural assimilation that the social transformation o the post-war workers states, and le establish- ment of full-blown stal list bureauc- racies based on the exercise of national state power, was closely connected with the exigencies of Soviet military and political strategy in maintaining its balance with imperialism - applies in its essential respects to Cuba itself. During 1962 Kruschev sought, in the most direct way possible, to use Cuba as a milit- ary point of pressure - like the 'buffer zone' for defence and deterrence against the main imperial- ist states; the most obvious differ- ence -important, but not abso lutely so that Cuba not adjacent to the Soviet Unio The post-war development of both nuclear fusion (hydrogen) bombs and long-range missiles made this, how- ever, less and less of a crucial factor.

Like the forces of production them- selves the nature of state (and milit- ary) power, has taken on not just international, but world-wide contours. The great states exercise power not just within their frontiers but on a world-wide basis. In the Cuban missile crisis, for example, matters were settled (incl ding the class nature of the state in Cuba) direct on the telephone between Washingto and Mosce with scarcely a ference back avana on Krusch s part re

TROTSKYISM

The masses in Cuba provided the forces which enabled Castro to oust Batista, propelled him towards expropriating the landowners and capitalists, and formed the bedrock of popular support for his regime which made it impossible for any merely 'pump-priming counter- revolutionary attempts such as the But the political Castro leadership appealing, for th Cuban revolution tional working cla Castro's moveme origins a national

ISERER INNOCHIS OH

character o ruled out defence of to the inte Like stalin had nati tlonk and. their of the tional working class. Like stalinism, origins, a national outlook, and, as it national developed into a eaucracy, national Taken as a wi Pation monthsinn Ily-fled interests. ole there ged bur- in is exceptional eati general thesis of 'structural tion'. For all the talk of independence. "socialism country' is (and was even mi early 1960s) an absolt imme iate economic imposs was question either of peace with imperialism, ° fore, prec res. assil 'nati in ire ite ibil it ma r de the the Genc Sovic with dence on and integration with the am the Stali comi Sovil blo sis and c ecol went graton wit ies. Hand internal i 62=95 oT Gastro's m, and in te alignment foreign policy. movemer ue coul of Cub:

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YISM

While a study of the history of Bolshevism in Russia can be of great educational value in showing the paths through which Lenin was able to lead the revolutionary seizure of power in October 1917, it is also of interest to study the ways in which latter-day pretenders to the heritage of Bolshevism seek to tailor events to conform to their own subjective and factional interests today. This article by John Lister and Mark Hyde examines the ways in which the International Marxist Group have under- taken such a rewriting of history in their series of articles on 'Faction and Party