Revolution, Counter-Revolution and Stalinism in Bulgaria

Revolution, counter-revolution and Stalinism in Bulgaria by Leon Schmidt. Leon id In September 1944 a popular upsurge dealt the final blow to the quasi-fascist monarchical government which had been ruling Bulgaria almost uninterruptedly since the military coup of 1923. In order to understand the nature and driving forces of the Bulgarian revolution, we must trace the development of the revolutionary forces by picking up the thread from around the turn of the century.

Bulgaria had ceased to be a part of the Turkish Empire in 1878. Independence encouraged development of capitalist tendencies and in the last two decades of the century the first factories appeared. This development gathered pace between 1900-1912, when legislation and state initiative actively encouraged industrialisation, more often than not with the help of an influx of foreign capital.

A situation in many ways similar to that of Russia was created (of course, on a much smaller scale), namely: in the midst of an agrarian country (80% in the case of Bulgaria), new industries developed, highly concentrated around a few key areas, with a homogenous proletariat recruited from the peasants, and undivided by craft affiliations. The mining town of Pernik (conveniently close to the capital was one such area. This newly created proletariat was like the Russian one, particularly responsive to socialist militant agitation by virtue of its homogenous nature. The Bulgarian Workers' Social Democratic Party (BWSP), founded in 1891, rapidly became the natural working class party. In 1903 it split between militants ("the Narrows') and reformists ("the Broads"), creating some confusion; but in a few years "the Broads" had crystalised as largely an intellectual forum, losing its working class base, whereas the "Narrow" wing enlarged its industrial base, so that by 1911, it was able to win local elections in industrial regions and to declare communes there (which were duly suppressed by the central government). By 1914 Bulgaria, having lost the Balkan wars, be drifting into the German orbit, a move engineered by unpopular Germanophile King Ferdinand (imposed independe Bulgaria by the Western Powers). A h gan the on uge Page 4 German bank loan to Bulgaria's capitalists, plus a promise to reverse the territorial settlements after the Balkan wars, clinched the deal so that by 1915 Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. This was not a popular decision and by 1916 this grudging acceptance turned into revolts on the front-line under the impact of war hardships and agitation of the "Narrows".

1917-1923. This period is characterised by a massive swing to the left by both workers and peasants. The news of the October Revolution came on top of runaway inflation, hunger and deprivation of the population, plus the severe losses in man- power (by this time, as a result of incessant wars, Bulgaria had lost 4% of its population dead and 7% severely wounded). The Bolshevik Peace Decree was spread along the front by socialist militants. Heavy defeats came soon after, resulting in mutinies and fraternization at the front.

By 1918 harvest failure and a new Allied offensive created a revolutionary situation which was sparked off by women's riots over food shortages. The armies at the Southern front mutinied and began to march on the capital, Sofia, hoisting the red flag on the way and setting up soviets in towns and villages on their way. The rebels were cut to pieces just outside Sofia for the following reasons: 1) Demands by the met by the "Narrows' stand the full revolutio they were in charge of. 2) The "Broad" Sc government, as did the Agrarians. 3) Highly trained modern machine guns Pernik miners to be arme • leadership which failec nary implications of the d were not to under- movement cial Democrats stood sol right wing of the biggest idly par by the ty-the German detach were thrown ments against armed with the badly- equipped and largery untit mutineers.

Nevertheless, Ferdinand had to abdicate his son Boris. The Germanophile gover discredited and e elections of 1919, taking atmosphere of itcally-orientated industrial th pol n favour of nment was place in an and student

strikes revealed only two rea i. The newly founded of the "Narrows") which h and had an industrial basis.

ii. The Agrarians-110 deputies and the poorer peasants (for comparison Conservatives who had 19 deputies).

Closely tied in with the election was the create a commune at the town of Dupnitza, wh stratore tanb auna tha trian I parties: Communist P ad 50 deputi rty

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OV 'ing han Out ber based let's ol ta idly ke on the attempt to ere demon- strators took over the town. This was smashed, but one highly important trend can be seen in a grass-roots alliance between poor peasants and workers (who were of peasant stock anyway): here militants on the run were sheltered and protected by poor peasants of the surrounding country- side The new Agrarian government under the famous leader Stambolisky implemented solid pro-poor peasant policies, against both land-owners and the cities (which hit workers too). This resulted in a breakdown of the Communist Party/ Agrarian co-operation, leading to physical clashes in the streets. This proved to be suicidal, for by 1921 quasi- fascist para-military groups appeared in Bulgaria, led by reserve officers and backed by General Wrangel, who had established a base in Bulgaria following his defeat in the Russian Civil War. To make things worse, the CP relapsed into ultra-left sectarianism, declaring all bourgeois govern- ments to be the same. By 1923, when Stambolisky began talking about a peasants' republic the CP had drifted off far enough for the quasi-fascist elements in the army to take power into their own hands, backed by King Boris, in the coup of 9 July 1923. The popular uprisings of 1923.

Following the coup, CP and left Agrarian militants (mostly youth) rose instinctively and in concert all over the country, especially in smaller towns, where the official split had not been felt. Here was a spontaneous revolution- ary movement against reaction and the monarchy; instead of assuming the leadership, the CP adopted the line of neutrality, holding aloof while its best front-line militants were shot down in the streets and barricades by the army.

As the new government began imprisoning Communist Party members en masse, once having put down the rebellion, the CP leaders, (namely Dimitrov and Kolarov) declared a new uprising in September. This was badly organised and leaked to the government; and the CP and Agrarians were still reeling from the blows in July. Conse- quently this uprising (led jointly by the CP and Agrarians) failed. It was put down with appalling bestiality and 20,000 perished (at the very least). The triumph of reaction was then consolidated by a drastic fall of wages and repeal of factory laws. Guerrilla warfare continued for sometime, but both the CP and Agrarian ranks had been decimated enough for this to grind to a halt.

The next few years witnessed a partial stabilisation of the traditionally explosive Bulgarian domestic scene, due to economic recovery and destruction of revolutionary cadres.

But the development of the revolutionary forces was not broken; it now centred around the CP, which was split (geographically) into two: 1) refugees in the USSR after were around 3,000. 2) militants at youth). Development of The defeats home working underground, (mainly Comm 1923 unist Part to v 1923-33. ideological spl Page group in the USSR: i. the leadership (Dimitrov and arov defended the actions of the Central Committee in 1923. They soon acquired a foothold in the Soviet bureaucracy.

li. a left opposition-mainly young cadres. This was not in any way Trotskyist (Bulgarian Trotskyism remained limited to a handful of intellectuals), but it attacked the leadership for lack of revolutionary approach and fossilization which did not permit them to emerge from the confines of radical "Narrowism". The opposition had gone through the hard school of street fighting, police torture and underground existence whereas the leaders' activity was largely confined to conferences and party meetings. The left was extremely strong and as it was aided by the Comintern "leftist" phase after 1928, it took the leadership a decade to defeat it.

How the conflict was able to be resolved was shown by 1930 when Kolarov enrolled the GPU to help his struggle against more prominent militants. Eventually the crisis of the Bulgarian Communist Party was resolved in the cellars and camps of the NKVD when the official Comintern's ideology changed its emphasis after 1933. In 1936 two conspiracies were concocted entailing the slaughter of 600 left cadres. One of the conspiracies dealt with Bulgarian "Trotskyists" plans to annex the Ukraine (which had no common border with Bulgaria!); another group was sentenced to death as Hitlerite agents. Of the people sent to the camps, very few survived, (including Pepov, one of the defendants in the Leipzig trial, freed in 1954).

At home, however, the left reigned supreme, recovering by the late 1920's and leading strikes and street agitation (the students union, affiliated to the CP in Bulgaria, had 20,000 members by 1932). Their leaders were summoned to Moscow and some. including the extremelv popular youth leader, Vasilev-Boilov, never retu left militants outside the reach of the Bulgarian prisons, where they were leaders. 1934-the The establish But the red.

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the Now the only D were inside unquestioned second fascist coup. monarcho-militarist administration some base of support by holding sh CP, under assumed names, won date. had tried to am elections. these rigged tete des ponce terror anotabiy in SoTia). AS IeTE cadres began agitating for social revolution and workers' control on the basis of the support as revealed here, the second coup took place, outlawing the Communist Party in all its guises and disbanding the trade unions which were replaced by a corporation trade union set up by the state.

Mass arrests and executions took place. Bulgaria was wrenched out of her French orbit and again placed in the German one by the new rulers.

By 1936, however, the Communist Party again had recovered and in co-operation with the Agrarians began infiltrating the official trade unions and various other organisations; eventually the Bulgarian Esperantists' Union and the Temperance League became converted into legal fronts for the CP. Another attempt to "legalise" the govern- ment by holding rigged elections took place in 1938, failing miserably and resulting in a further clampdown on opposition. By 1941 the course of Bulgaria in the it to join the Axis. Almost single-handed scheme having never really got off the organised an impressive mobilisation, ferment and putting a halt to any atte Bulgarian soldiers to the Eastern Front Hitler repeatedly requested of Boris) German orbit led (a Popular Front ground), the CP leading to mass mpts to dispatch something which

By 1942, despite demoralisation, internal splits and continuous loss of cadres, guerrilla units, composed largely of CP members or sympathisers, took to the mountains.

Partisan warfare here never reached Yugoslav proportions, but it harassed both the government and the German forces stationed in the country, while at the same time spreading socialist propaganda, thus transcending the limits of a simple liberation movement to one of social revolution.

By the end of 1942 the police had discovered the underground network of the movement and as they moved in, the whole apparatus caved in. But Stalingrad gave a psychological boost and the CP, rising yet again from the ruins, intensified the partisan warfare, establishing plans for the eventual overthrow of the government once Germany collapsed. By 1943-4, young militants drafted into the army began to find support and sometimes led whole army units, complete with equipment, into the mountains. A report of the military counter espionage service reads: "The advance of communism among the army has been universal, persistent and well-organised communism has penetrated all army sections withou exception."

The final stage. By 1944, despite rutality which shocked foreign observers like the New York Times correspondent, the movement assumed mass proportions. This led to drastic class polarisation: on one side stood, closely grouped together, the monarchy, fascist groupings, military chiefs and since the partisans agitated for social revolution, the bourgeoisie; on the other side stood the poor peasants and workers, alienated from the official parties through being exploited in the interests of the German war machine, who came to be grouped around their traditional representatives (albeit now outlawed) the CP and the left Agrarians.

The final straw that broke the camel's back was Russia's declaration of war on 5 September 1944. As the Red Army stopped briefly at the Danube, the highly electrified situation in Bulgaria discharged itself. On September 6, Sofia went on strike; on September 7 Pernik struck; the same day upheavals took place in the port of Varna and in the city of Pleven crowds stormed the prison, releasing the political prisoners. On the night of 8/9 September military units in key cities were infiltrated by agitators and changed sides (notably the tank battallion stationed at Sofia). On September 9/10 the partisan units came down from the mountains; the CP and its various affiliated organisations, together with the left Agrarians, broke cover and took to the streets. Due to the polarisation outlined above, the bourgeois and fascist groupings fled into Greece and Turkey. All the key administrative centres were taken before the Red Army showed up. The over- throw of German domination had grown into a social revolution. Beginnings of degeneration.

The presence of the Red Army had contradictory effects on the course of the revolution. On the one had, its very presence (it did little, as there was no need for it to intervene) stifled counter-revolution-eg attempts by the Allies to foster counter-revolutionary movements in the mountains bordering Turkey fizzled out in a matter of months. On the other hand, due to Stalin's agreements with the Allies, it often held back the revolutionary wave so as not to offend or provoke the Allied armies present. This led to the monarchy not being abolished until 1946; nation- alisation was put off until 1949 Kolatov instructed Page returning emigres now something of a few years. At the same time, the CP gradually lost all links with its revolutionary heritage. Its development had been chequered with disasters and defeats, and, although surviving by 1944, it was bled white. Returning emigres having been through the school of Stalinism for anything up to 20 years, took the lead position in the utterly exhausted CP. Faceless bureaucrats who had never smelt gun powder (like the new leader Chervenkov) acted as emissaries for Stalinism. They engineered the 1940's purges which hit the CP when it could least afford it, destroying numerous prominent partisans and revolu- tionaries. Even Kostov-a loyal Stalinist-was shot as the purges of the purgers began. The CP's revolutionary heritage was physically annihilated through the destruction of the militant cadres. The massive recruitment campaign begun in the late 1940's filled the decimated ranks of the CP with opportunists, careerists and ex-Social Democrats, turning it into a truly Stalinist instrument. By the early 1950's the revolution, a result of decades of bitter struggle, was unrecognisable under the decaying influence Stalinism. Le Tastic? Program *It is a programme for action from today until the beginning of hens or latest rewou thom.

And forin the practicad point off view what is now the most important is how we can guide the different strata of the proletariat in the direc- tion of the social revolution*

TROTSKY

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